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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Background and research questions
The workings of the human mind as well as the evolution of mankind itself are areas that 
remain greatly unexplored. As a psychologist and an archaeologist, they are both of great 
interest to me. The combination of these two fields of research in the fairly recent 
practice of cognitive archaeology might not seem very logical however. What can a study 
focusing on living subjects and their neurological and behavioural actions and responses 
contribute to one focusing on the remains of people living thousands of years ago? The 
obvious second question is of course why we would want to go into this line of research. 
Can cognitive research truly contribute to the archaeological field of study, and is it worth 
studying? Because of this seemingly weak link, the importance of cognitive research, and 
its relevance to the archaeological field need to be underlined before moving on to further 
research and results that are based on the interaction between these two disciplines. 
Archaeology in itself is limited by several interpretative constraints. Problems of 
preservation and discontinuity play a major role in the interpretation of archaeological 
data. Despite being limited by these constraints, its interests are broad, and include the 
reconstruction of not just past human behaviour, but society as a whole and all its 
influencing factors, including the cognitive processes underlying behaviour. When 
looking at the evolution of mankind, it is not only our physical and cultural qualities that 
are part of this evolution, but also our cognitive capabilities. Archaeology is not capable 
of dealing with these matters on its own however. Archaeological data might be able to 
provide a time line and background to the evolution of our cognitive capacities, but it 
cannot explain the reasons behind the behavioural changes seen in the record or the 
questions they raise concerning their bases in changes in cognitive and neural 
characteristics. These can only be answered through the incorporation of modern 
cognition studies. Archaeology has thus through necessity become more interdisciplinary 
throughout the years, incorporating psychological and neurological research and theory 
into its repertoire in the process. This had led to the introduction of cognitive 
archaeology. 
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Through the incorporation of these cognitive sciences, the field of cognitive 
archaeology tries to reconstruct the nature of the prehistoric mind, in an attempt to 
explain the behaviour reflected by the material remains in the archaeological record.
The application of this cognitive research to archaeology has led to further 
problems however. The models and theories of cognitive science were not made with 
archaeology in mind, nor were archaeological models made with cognition in mind. 
Because of this separation, most of these theories are not especially well suited to the 
other respective field, and their application often does not live up to the standards of both 
fields.
Regardless of these problems, there have been several attempts within 
archaeology to comment on the evolution of human cognition. In order to do so within 
archaeology, we must necessarily look at the material remains of past human behaviour, 
and try to link this behaviour to aspects of cognition. Because much of the research is 
focused on finding out when humans evolved the cognitive skillset we posses today, this 
has led to the discussion of which behaviours are and which are not representative of 
modern day cognition. 
Within this discussion, terms such as “modern” and “complex” behaviour and 
cognition are often used, in order to distinguish between behavioural and cognitive 
capabilities on a level with that of modern day people, and earlier forms of behaviour and 
cognition that do not meet this level. The problem with these terms is that there is no 
agreed upon definition of their exact meaning. They are used in several different forms 
and with several different meanings throughout the archaeological field. By some for 
instance, “modern” behaviour has been related to behaviours specifically tied to the 
emergence of anatomically modern humans (AMH) (Mellars 2005; Bickerton 2007). 
Others classify it as a range of traits which appear in the behaviour of AMH as the result 
of a neurological change after having shared a previous behavioural repertoire with 
earlier hominins (Chase 2003; Klein 2008). Still others view it as the distinguishing 
characteristic that sets AMH apart from other species, searching for that which makes us 
human, by many researchers often tied to symbolic behaviour (Noble & Davidson 1991, 
1996; Stringer & Gamble 1993; Wadley 2001; Henshilwood & Marean 2003; Marean et 
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al. 2007; Soffer 2009).
The same is true for the term “modern cognition”. There is no agreed upon set of 
constructs which constitute “modern”cognition. The term is often used to imply different 
cognitive constructs that are thought to reflect hallmark aspects of current cognitive 
sophistication, such as syntactical language, symbol-use, enhanced working memory, or 
multiple intelligences (Nowell 2010).
A further point of confusion is that the term “modern behaviour” is not always 
used in connection with cognition. Not all researchers are of the opinion that the changes 
in behaviour seen through the archaeological record reflect changes in cognition. Some 
believe rather that these changes reflect social, demographic, historical, or cultural factors 
(Nowell 2010). Chase (2006) argues for instance that symbolic behaviour was present in 
humans long before it became detectable, and only became visible in the archaeological 
record after it started to influence social behaviour. 
As the purpose of this thesis is to evaluate certain aspects of cognition however,  I 
will be focusing on cognitive explanations of behaviour. I will be using the term 
“sophisticated” cognition, to indicate aspects of cognition which are thought to represent 
modern-day cognitive capabilities. The term “modern” will be used only to describe other 
authors' opinion on the subject of behavioural and cognitive modernity, as used by them.
Despite all these issues, several theories have been put forth by different authors 
on how, when and where modern humans developed the cognitive capacities they possess 
today (McBrearty and Brooks 2000; d'Errico 2003; Bar-Josef 2003; Klein and Edgar 
2002; Wynn and Coolidge 2009). Some have argued for a relatively sudden onset of 
modern behaviour and cognition around 50.000 years ago (Bar-Yosef 2003; Klein and 
Edgar 2002; Wynn and Coolidge 2009), while others have posited that this was the result 
of a much more gradual development, with characteristics of cognitive sophistication 
having been assembled over a period of over 200.000 years over several different 
continents (McBrearty and Brooks 2000). Still others have suggested a parallel and 
gradual development of aspects of cognition in different regions throughout the world, by 
different groups of hominins (d'Errico 2003). 
While these theories consider the timing and placement of human cognitive and 
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behavioural evolution, they generally do not explicitly mention what these cognitive 
changes precisely entail. There have been some theories in which this has been attempted. 
These can be generally divided into three main categories. The first focuses on 
symbolism and language (e.g. Henshilwood 2004). The second focuses on Theory of 
Mind, the ability to attribute mental states such as beliefs, intents and desires to oneself 
and to others (e.g. Barnard 2010). The third focuses on modularity; the division of the 
mind into closed-off, domain specific modules; and working memory, a cognitive 
construct that is responsible for holding information in active memory for further 
processing (e.g. Mithen 1996; Wynn and Coolidge 2009). Especially the symbolic 
approach has been very popular within cognitive archaeology. Research into this field has 
unfortunately not always taken the modern views of cognitive science into account, and 
has often failed to be specific about the cognitive abilities under discussion, or whether 
these abilities are recognized by cognitive science (Wynn and Coolidge 2009). 
Studies incorporating more recent lines of cognitive theory, have gradually moved 
away from this symbolic approach, and have underlined the importance of probabilistic 
(non-symbolic) reasoning and information processing as one of the underlying factors in 
cognitive sophistication (Doya et al. 2007; Chater and Oaksford 2009; Clark 2008). This 
suggests that we should be more rigorous in carrying out cognitive archaeology and 
consider non-symbolic explanations along with the other theories that have been put 
forth.
So far, all the theories that have been mentioned have focused on the cognitive 
development of anatomically modern humans (AMH). Very few attempts have been 
made to accurately determine cognition for other hominin species throughout history, 
whose cognitive abilities are often viewed as simply “not human”, and therefore less 
impressive or less interesting. The focus on anatomically modern humans is not 
completely surprising, as much of what drives cognition research is the interest in how 
our particular cognition developed throughout time, and the ability to possibly help 
answer current cognitive questions. 
Nonetheless, research into the cognition of different hominin species could still 
provide important information. Wynn and Coolidge (2009) have argued that aspects of 
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cognitive capacities evolved in different stages throughout evolution. They  point out that 
as some of these aspects are shared with other primates, in order to understand human 
cognition we cannot look at Homo sapien cognition alone. Determining similarities and 
differences between primates and modern humans for instance can help answer questions 
of when certain aspects of cognition may have developed. Research into this area can 
also aid in explaining the extinction and survival of groups of hominins, by looking for 
evidence of cognitive abilities that would have aided or limited their survival. It can also 
be helpful in determining questions of relatedness with other species, alongside evidence 
from fossil morphology and DNA. 
All these issues are relevant to our own evolution. Of course from an 
archaeological perspective, it has equally as much value in itself, without necessarily 
informing us about anatomically modern humans. By looking at the evolution of 
cognition of hominins in general, it can provide valuable information regarding all sorts 
of questions concerning the archaeological record, and why specific traces are found or 
lacking in it.
Specifically research into Neandertal cognition, being our closest relative in time, 
could provide great insight into our evolutionary history. There have been a few attempts 
made at determining the cognitive sophistication of Neanderthals (e.g. Wynn and 
Coolidge 2004; Mithen 1996). These have been mostly based on interpretations of 
Neanderthal behaviour as seen through the archeological remains.
For a long time before the arrival of AMH, from around 200 to 30 ka (Wynn and 
Coolidge 2011) Neandertals ruled throughout Europe, adapting to the constantly 
changing climatic conditions. Studies have shown Neandertals to have adapted to these 
changing circumstances very well, allowing them to dominate in Europe for thousands of 
years. Neandertals have often been left behind in the discussions concerning 
technological, behavioural and cognitive capabilities though. While often thought to be 
less advanced and less capable than AMH, research has shown them to probably have 
employed a range of behaviours listed by different authors as aspects of “modernity”. 
These behaviours include range expansion, similar resource exploitation, planning 
behaviour, adaptation to numerous and diverse ecosystems, symbolic behaviour, and 
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language (Deacon 1997; McBrearty and Brooks 2000; Adler et al. 2006; Tattersall 2009).
Evidence for range expansion for instance comes from recent research (Krause et  
al. 2007)  showing Neandertals to have expanded their range even further than previously 
thought. Evidence has been found of their presence at the sites of Teshik Tash, 
Uzbekistan; where the remains of a human child were found to carry Neandertal mtDNA; 
and Okladnikov cave, Siberia; where the remains of an adult and sub-adult individual 
were found to have belonged to a population related to European and Western Asian 
Neandertals (ibid.). This evidence shows Neandertals to have traveled some 2000 
kilometers further east than previously thought, and to clearly have been capable of 
adapting to differing climatic circumstances(ibid.)
Indications of long-term planning come from evidence of hunting behaviours that 
are very similar to that of AMH, with the two being equally skilled at exploiting a range 
of different ecological zones (Adler et al. 2006). 
Evidence from sites such as the Grotte du Renne, Caune de Belvis, Saint-C´esaire 
and Quinçay also indicate Neandertal production of ornaments and bone tools, seen 
through the presence of re-fittings and by-products (d'Errico 1998; d'Errico and Zilhao 
1999; Zilhao 2007). Though this is disputed by certain authors (Higham et al. 2010), 
claiming intrusion of symbolic artefacts from overlying Protoaurignacian layers, other 
authors (Caron et al. 2011) deny this statement, arguing for stratigraphic integrity. If 
stratigraphic integrity is indeed maintained, this could indicate the use of symbolism by 
Neandertals, on which as we have seen many indications of cognitive complexity for 
AMH have been based (Deacon 1996, 1997; McBrearty and Brooks 2000; Henshilwood 
2004; Tattersall 2009)
Analysis of Neanderthal anatomy indicates that they were also probably capable 
of speech, though the precise level of speech is not known (Wynn and Coolidge 2011). 
Evidence from fossil endocasts of Neandertal skulls, indicating an expanded Broca's area 
(a region in the brain used to control speech production) supports this idea (ibid.)
Having occupied the same area for several thousand years in the Upper and 
possibly Middle Palaeolithic, recent DNA research has further shown interbreeding to 
have taken place between Neandertals and anatomically modern humans (Green et al.. 
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2010). This has raised questions of phylogenetic relatedness of our two species. 
 These behaviours are all very similar to those seen in AMH, but have not led to 
similar inferences on their possible cognitive capabilities. If such areas of cultural, 
technological and subsistence overlap between Neandertals and modern humans indeed 
existed, and there were enough physical and genetic similarities to allow for successful 
interbreeding, the possibility of there having been cognitive similarities as well is not so 
far-fetched. Even though the link between Neandertals and specific cognitive capabilities 
might be difficult to make, it seems that it has remained disproportionately unresearched. 
The link between modern humans and  their cognitive evolution is clearly a 
fragile one. However, the evidence that has been accepted as implying sophisticated 
cognitive capabilities for AMH should be applied to the Neandertal record with equal 
validity if similar evidence is found. Most research seems to rather easily set aside the 
possibility of Neandertal cognitive sophistication to work on AMH cognition, often 
assuming it to be less complex than our own and possibly not worth much effort. This is 
of course very much in line with, and possibly influenced by, the general and popular 
view of Neandertals being merely simple cavemen, of not especially high intelligence. 
This corresponds to Roebroeks and Corbey's (2001) suggestion of a double 
standard being used when it comes to interpretations of archaeological evidence from the 
Upper Palaeolithic period and AMH, and the Middle and Lower Palaeolithic periods and 
earlier hominin species. This double standard is illustrated by the authors through an 
example concerning the interpretation of evidence for purposeful burial by Neandertals. 
While the criteria set up for intentional burial (Gargett 1988) are applied very strictly to 
the Neandertal context, leaving the record with no remaining intentional burials by 
Neandertals, these criteria are applied much more loosely to the Upper Palaeolithic 
period for AMH burials. The authors note that should these criteria be equally strictly 
applied to the Upper Palaeolithic period, most (22 out of 28) of these so-called burials 
would also not live up to the proposed standards (Villa 1989) of intentional burial. This 
illustrates the tendency of many researchers to view evidence of Neandertal behaviour in 
a different light than that of AMH, leading to obvious biases in interpretation.
This thesis will attempt to address the issues of unequal research and double 
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standards in this area through a specific case study. The aim of this thesis will be to 
compare specific findings from the Neandertal record with similar findings from the 
AMH record that have been used to imply cognitive sophistication for AMH. This 
comparison will then be used to comment on Neandertal cognition. Through a 
comparison of a generally well-accepted source of evidence for AMH cognitive 
sophistication at Sibudu Cave, South Africa (Wadley et al. 2010), and several sources 
from the European Neandertal record (Koller et al. 2001, Pawlik and Thissen 2011 ), I 
will attempt to comment on the level of cognitive sophistication of the Neandertal mind. I 
will use the evidence from Sibudu Cave, South Africa (Wadley et al. 2010) as a starting 
point for this comparison. This research shows modern humans to have manufactured a 
compound adhesive used to attach stone points to shafts to create spears. These adhesives 
date to around 70 ka (ibid.). Through a very well documented replication of the adhesive 
production process, it has been argued that creating this adhesive required several 
cognitive skills equally advanced as those modern humans possess today, namely 
enhanced working memory (Wynn and Coolidge 2009), fourth-order abstraction (Barnard 
2010), multi-level operations and non-routine thought (Amati and Shallice 2007), mental 
rotation (Kane 2004), embedded recursion (Reuland 2010), and cognitive fluidity 
(Mithen 1996).
My reasons for using this specific research are twofold. The first is that the 
cognitive implications that are made are based on technical procedures and knowledge 
rather than indications of symbolism. Where the weight and meaning of symbolic 
behaviour has been greatly disputed in archaeological as well as cognitive interpretations, 
this is less so for tool manufacture. The second reason is that similar examples of 
adhesive production can be found in the European record associated with Neandertals 
(Koller et al. 2001; Mazza et al. 2006; Pawlik and Thissen 2011), thus allowing for an 
optimum comparison between the two species. 
Specifically, I will focus on two German sites. First, the site of Königsaue, where 
adhesives have been found to date to approximately 80 ka (Koller et al. 2001), and have 
been clearly linked to the Neandertals. Second, the equally well-documented site of 
Inden-Altdorf, also linked to Neandertals (Pawlik and Thissen 2011). These adhesives 
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have been described by many however as merely “simple” adhesives (Wadley et al. 
2009), that do not involve much effort to create, and certainly do not imply any advanced 
cognitive abilities. They have therefore not been linked to any cognitive theories, nor 
have any attempts been made to draw any conclusions as to the cognitive capabilities of 
Neandertals from them. 
Though an analysis of the cognitive implications made by Wadley for the 
adhesive production at Sibudu Cave has already been made (Wynn 2009), in order to 
accurately compare this case with examples from the Neandertal record, a more in-depth 
analysis is required as a basis for a cognitive comparison.
1.2 Methods and data
The main research question for this thesis will be whether it is possible to comment on 
Neandertal cognition through the study of AMH and Neandertal adhesive production. 
This research question will be divided into several  subquestions. The first question will 
be whether the inferences on AMH cognition, based on the evidence for adhesive 
production are convincing and well-founded. The second will be whether the adhesive 
production processes of AMH and Neandertals under review are can be reliably 
compared. The third question will be whether the cognitive capacities that have been 
linked to AMH, and found to be valid, can be linked to Neandertals as well. The fourth 
and final question will be whether alternative cognitive explanations can be found to 
account for the adhesive production of Neandertals and AMH other than the constructs of 
cognitive sophistication that have been suggested.
These questions will be investigated by looking at the adhesive production 
process for AMH at Sibudu Cave as well as the accompanying cognitive inferences, 
which will be evaluated with respect to their validity. The production process of the two 
German Neandertal sites will then be inspected and compared to that of Sibudu Cave, and 
possible cognitive implications based on this process will be considered. 
A number of researchers have developed criteria for the what constitutes a valid 
argument in cognitive archaeology (Botha 2008; Wynn and Coolidge 2009). Two of these 
sets of criteria will provide a framework for the thesis and will be discussed in more 
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detail below. The two sets of guidelines that will be used for this evaluation will be 
Botha's (2008) concepts of groundedness and warantedness, and Wynn and Coolidge's 
(2009) strict standard. These two guidelines can be used simultaneously because they 
have similar requirements. Wynn and Coolidge's strict standard (2009), made up of the 
criteria of archaeological and cognitive validity, correspond broadly to Botha's (2008) 
requirements of groundedness and warantedness, respectively. These criteria will be 
applied by looking at the archaeological data, assessing whether the methods that were 
used are in line with current archaeological approaches for this type of evidence, and 
evaluating the cognitive/psychological evidence for the inferred constructs and relating 
this to cognitive validity.
The data for this study will consist of published material on Palaeolithic adhesives 
from Sibudu Cave, South Africa (Wadley 2010); Königsaue, Germany (Koller et al. 
2001), and Inden-Altdorf (Pawlik and Thissen 2011), also in Germany. In addition, I will 
use literature on experimental and cognitive studies (Wynn and Coolidge 2009,Barnard 
2010, Amati and Shallice 2007; Kane 2004; Haidle 2010; Reuland 2010, and Mithen 
1996) which are used as a basis for evaluating the cognitive inferences of the adhesive 
production process at Sibudu Cave. 
I have chosen the site of Sibudu Cave because it is a generally well-accepted 
source of evidence for modern human cognitive sophistication, for which a very elaborate 
description is available of the production process of the adhesive created there by early 
humans. The elaborate nature of the description of the production process, including 
detailed accounts of the production sequence, chemical investigations, use-wear studies, 
and microscopic analysis, will allow for a thorough analysis of the production process 
itself as well as the interpretations of cognition based on that process. 
The two German sites have been selected because they represent well-documented 
evidence of Neandertal adhesive production, including detailed accounts of use wear, 
mircoscopic analyses, and chemical investigations. The similar industry and clear 
stratigraphy of these sites make for a good match, while the dating of these sites at 
around 80 (Koller et al. 2001) and 120 ka (Pawlik and Thissen 2011), for Königsaue and 
Inden-Altdorf respectively, places them clearly within the Neandertal period. The 
14
relative closeness in age of these samples compared to those at Sibudu Cave (~70 ka)
(Wadley 2010) also makes for a good comparison. I have chosen to use two sites for this 
analysis because it will provide a larger sample and thereby a better foundation for my 
conclusions of Neandertal cognition being comparable in certain aspects to that of 
anatomically modern humans.
1.3 Chapter outline
Following the introduction, the second chapter will underline  the importance of 
cognitive research in archaeology. Beginning with a detailed description of the problems 
one encounters when applying cognitive theory to the archaeological setting, and possible 
ways to circumvent these, this will be followed by a more elaborate description of the 
cognitive theories that have been applied to the archaeological setting within the field of 
cognitive archaeology. I will analyse their strong and weak points, and discuss the more 
recent influences coming from the field of cognitive science regarding these theories, as 
well as  the manner in which they might be applied to the archaeological setting. Wynn 
and Coolidge's (2009) strict standard, and Botha's (2008) criteria of groundedness and 
warantedness will be discussed as guidelines for the structuring of a valid argument in 
cognitive archaeology, which will then be applied to the following chapters. 
This overview will aid in my analysis of the models used by Wadley (2010) for 
Sibudu Cave, help me to critique them, and suggest possible alternative models that could 
be applied to the evidence for adhesive production
Chapter 3 will entail a description and analysis of the production process of the 
hafting material used at Sibudu Cave as described by Wadley in her 2010 article 
(Lombard 2005, 2006; Delagne et al. 2006; Shae 2006). This will involve several steps. 
The first step will be to analyse the evidence for hafting given by Wadley. In order to 
reach the criteria for archaeological validity according to Wynn and Coolidge (2009) and 
Botha (2008), the inference of hafting has to be shown to be grounded in archaeological 
evidence before any conclusions can be drawn based on that evidence. This evidence will 
be gathered through the reproduction experiments performed and described by Wadley, 
an analysis of the compound adhesive ingredients and manufacture, and evidence from 
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use-wear studies, residue analyses, and microscopic analysis, which have provided 
identifying markers to indicate hafting (Rots 2002). This information will come from 
Wadley's current analysis as well as from earlier work (Lombard 2005, 2006; Delagne et  
al. 2006; Shae 2006; Wadley 2006). This analysis will be used to summarize the key 
procedures and knowledge shown in the production process.
This will be followed by an analysis of the cognitive inferences made by Wadley 
in the article. The link between the procedures and knowledge that are used, and the 
cognitive abilities that are inferred from them, will be analysed. In order to do this, I will 
evaluate the cognitive models on which Wadley bases her claims for cognitive 
sophistication, and comment on their relevance, strong and weak points, and their validity 
and acceptance within the field of cognitive science. The inferences themselves will be 
critiqued on their archaeological and cognitive validity according to Wynn and Coolidge's 
strict standard (Wynn and Coolidge 2009), as well as Botha's arguments for groundedness 
and warantedness (Botha 2008).
On the basis of this analysis a guideline will be set up for the knowledge and 
procedures required for these cognitive inferences. In order for these inferences on 
cognition to live up to the criteria for archaeological validity, they must be clearly 
indicated in the archaeological record. For cognitive validity, the procedures and skills 
must be shown to be necessary for the production process, and have support from 
cognitive science. These guidelines will then be connected to the actual procedures and/or 
skills described in the production process. This guideline will then be employed in the 
next chapter in order to comment on the cognitive sophistication of Neandertals, and to 
see which inferences might be made with regard to the local adhesive production process.
I will then attempt to link the procedures and knowledge argued by Wadley to be 
required for the adhesive production to possible alternative cognitive explanations. The 
information for this section will come from my review of cognitive archaeology in the 
previous section as well as other literature from the field of cognitive science and 
cognitive archaeology. This will be done in an attempt to see if there are other cognitive 
explanations possible that might be responsible for the adhesive production other than the 
ones proposed by Wadley. If simpler explanations can be provided, a good case can be 
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made that these would have been responsible for the production process, rather than the 
more advanced ones (Wynn and Coolidge 2009). 
Chapter 4 will entail an analysis of the two German sites. This will again involve 
the description and analysis of the hafting procedure at the sites of Königsaue, and Inden-
Altdorf, Germany, based on residue analysis, use-wear studies and microscopic analysis 
(Koller et al. 2001; Pawlik and Thissen 2011). The same careful evaluation will be 
applied to these sites as was applied to Sibudu Cave in the previous chapter. The validity 
of the claim of adhesive and tool production will be looked into first, again with respect 
to its archaeological validity (Wynn and Coolidge 2009), and Botha's (2008) requirement 
of groundedness. A description will be given of the possible adhesive manufacturing 
process at the sites, along with an evaluation of the ingredients and techniques that are 
used in this sequence. 
As there have been no former attempts to link the production sequences at these 
sites to cognition for Neandertals, this will be the goal of the following section. Careful 
evaluation of the production process will determine precisely which actions and/or skills 
were required to produce the adhesives at these sites. I will then determine which 
cognitive inferences might be made based on these actions that can satisfy the criteria for 
cognitive validity (Wynn and Coolidge 2009) and warantedness (Botha 2008). I will 
further attempt to find  possible alternative cognitive explanations that might be applied 
to the Neandertal context, once again drawing from my earlier analysis and other sources 
of cognitive science. 
Chapter 5 will conclude and discuss the findings of this thesis, the effectiveness of 
the methods that were employed, the implications that these findings may have put forth 
for broader issues in human origin research, and possibilities for further research.
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Chapter 2. Approaches to cognitive research in archaeology: a critical review
2.1 Chapter introduction
The goal of this thesis is to compare AMH and Neandertal cognitive abilities 
involved in adhesive making. In order to do this, I must first give an overview of the 
different models and theories used in cognitive archaeology to make this kind of 
comparison. In order to gain a better understanding of the intellectual background of this 
field, and where its research has brought us so far, this chapter will serve to outline the 
different approaches that are used, their successfulness and current standing within 
cognitive science, and their usefulness for this thesis. It will outline the difficulties in 
such cognitive applications to archaeology and provide guidelines for overcoming these 
difficulties. This will aid me in my analysis of Wadley's research by identifying the 
cognitive background of the inferences made by her, and help me to evaluate them more 
accurately. It will also help me identify alternative approaches that might be applicable to 
Wadley's research.
Before the main theories are explained more fully, it is necessary to acknowledge 
some of the main problems in applying cognitive research to the archaeological field, and 
the ways in which we might overcome these problems. There have been a few researchers 
who have set up guidelines for carrying out sound cognitive archaeology (Botha 2008; 
Wynn and Coolidge 2009). These will be discussed currently.
2.2 Problems and ways forward
One of the main problems in cognitive archaeology is that cognitive models are created 
for application to living subjects. Archaeology unfortunately does not have any living 
subjects to work with, making the application of cognitive models that much more 
difficult. All archaeologists can do is make inferences about past actions from the 
remains found in the record. The record unfortunately does not give a continuous 
overview of all past actions, but merely shows the effects of some of those actions. 
Because of the nature of archaeology, often working through excavation, this means that 
18
results unfortunately cannot be replicated as in laboratory circumstances. A lot of material 
can only be analysed a limited amount of times, and it is impossible to go back and 
document items in their original state again once they've been removed. Everything needs 
to be documented correctly the first time, or risk biasing all future interpretations based 
on that documentation. 
A second problem is that of preservation. Material remains that are found are 
necessarily biased, as some materials survive more than others in the archaeological 
record, and many do not survive at all. This is why stone tools are by far the largest group 
of artifacts found in the record. Some environments, such as very dry or cold areas, 
preserve material much better than for instance tropical areas (Wynn 2002), causing a 
definite skew in the apparent location of finds. One area can appear to be a highly 
favoured location for past hominin visitation, due to its high find density, whereas 
another produces no finds at all. These areas might be labeled as unfavourable, when in 
reality the difference is merely due to different levels of preservation. Colder areas might 
seem more behaviourally diverse than warmer ones for instance, because more material 
has survived there. Age is another influencing factor, for the further back in time we go, 
the less we find, giving a misleadingly progressive appearance to the record (Wynn 
2002). This will tend to make more recent behaviour seem more varied, and lead to the 
interpretation of increasingly complex cognition, when this is not necessarily the case.
Wynn, having studied these issues intensely for quite some time (Wynn 
1979;1985;1991;2002; 2010) has boiled these problems and biases in the record down to 
two concrete questions concerning cognitive implications that are based on this record. 
The first question is “if traces of actions can reliably inform us about aspects of 
cognition”(Wynn 2002, 389). The second is “if archaeologists can overcome the 
methodological problems accompanying these issues” (Wynn 2002, 389). 
Looking at the first question, Wynn immediately notes that psychologists also 
make inferences from traces of actions (Wynn 2002). Psychologists however have the 
advantage of being able to talk to their subjects. Is it possible then, to make inferences on 
cognition without the subject in question being there to study? According to Wynn, it 
might be, but the links to cognition that are made need to be that much stronger. If there 
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should be any doubt, or possible alternative explanations, there is no test subject to fall 
back on to strengthen your theoretical arguments. Archaeologists need to provide highly 
reliable evidence of the cognitive meaning of archaeological finds. This is of course not 
very easy, partly due to the fact that cognitive models were not created with the 
archaeological setting in mind, nor archaeological models with cognition in mind. 
Looking at archaeological approaches for instance, the technocultural taxonomy used in 
archaeological classifications is an organizational system that was defined based purely 
on tool types and manufacturing techniques, and did not have cognition in mind when it 
was created (Wynn and Coolidge 2009). These periodizations can affect interpretations of 
behaviour and cognition (Roebroeks and Corbey 2001).
Wynn and Coolidge have argued that many researchers have approached cognitive 
archaeology the wrong way around. They start with archaeological remains, and try to 
build a cognitive argument from there, when instead they should be starting with a 
behaviour linked to an aspect of modern cognition, and try to identify archaeological 
indications of this behaviour (Wynn and Coolidge 2009).
In order to make sure cognitive implications based on archaeology are indeed 
reliable, Wynn and Coolidge have developed what they have called a “strict standard” for 
cognitive archaeology (Wynn and Coolidge 2009). This strict standard is made up of two 
main components: cognitive validity and archaeological validity. Cognitive validity 
requires that the cognitive ability that is argued is not only recognized by cognitive 
science, but is also necessary for the behaviour stated, and that this behaviour must be 
required for the archaeological traces implying this behaviour. Archaeological validity 
holds that the archaeological evidence in itself must be credible, and based on accepted 
scientific archaeological methods (ibid.).
In this strict standard, they argue that for a cognitive archaeological argument to 
be persuasive and to have cognitive validity, it needs to adhere to three methodological 
requirements. The first requirement listed by Wynn and Coolidge states that “it is 
necessary that the archaeologist understand the cognitive ability in question” (Wynn and 
Coolidge 2009, 118). They argue that without adequate background knowledge of 
modern cognition and its defining features, one cannot properly argue about modern 
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cognition. The second requirement is that “the archaeologist must identify specific 
actions or sets of actions that are enabled by the ability in question”(ibid., 118). Because 
the archaeological record consists of traces of actions, not traces of cognition, the link 
between the two must be explicit. The third and final argument states that “the 
archaeologist must then define a set of criteria (attributes), by which these actions can be 
reliably identified in the archaeological record”(ibid.,118). It is through adherence to this 
type of framework that archaeologists will be capable of making reliable cognitive 
inferences from traces of actions.
This brings us to the second question, whether archaeologists are able to 
overcome the methodological difficulties accompanying the inherent problems in 
archaeology. Wynn (2002) proposes that in order to overcome the obstacles of an 
incomplete record, and preservation and age biases, cognitive archaeologists should look 
from a more psychological perspective, instead of a purely archaeological one, and avoid 
using standard archaeological classifications of time periods and cultural complexes to 
comment on cognition. Rather than trying to define differences in cognition for certain 
industries or complexes, they should work from a more evolutionary scale, focusing on 
long-term patterns of change instead of specific changes in technology or cultural 
complexes (ibid.). 
Another model insuring the validity of cognitive arguments in archaeology has 
been proposed by Botha (2008), in his critique of an archaeological argument for the use 
of syntactical language by people from Blombos Cave some 77.000 years ago. This 
argument, proposed by d'Errico (2003) discusses shell beads that were recovered by 
d’Errico and Henshilwood at Blombos cave in South Africa, dating to about 77 ka. These 
shell beads have been interpreted by them as evidence that the people who produced them 
had “fully syntactical language” (Henshilwood et al. 2004, 404). The line of reasoning 
for this argument is that the shells, which are perforated in a manner that is not naturally 
occurring, are similar in colour and form, and which show a use-wear pattern that is 
argued to be consistent with the shells rubbing against clothes, represent beads (ibid.). 
Beads are in turn seen as personal ornaments, and are thereby argued to be symbols 
(ibid.). In order to transmit the symbolic meaning of these beads, the authors have argued 
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that fully syntactical language would have been required (ibid.).
Botha has argued however that the underlying arguments for this line of reasoning 
are not sound. He introduces the two concepts of groundedness and warantedness, which 
he applies to the arguments at hand. The first concept, that of groundedness, states that 
“inferences about (language) evolution need to be grounded in data or empirical 
assumptions about properties of phenomena that are well-understood” (Botha 2008, 200), 
in other words, they must have some evidential basis in order for them to be valid. The 
second concept, that of warantedness, states that “the inferential steps leading to 
conclusions about what (language) evolution involved need to be suitably warranted or 
licensed” (ibid. 200). In other words, there should be a good argument explaining how 
these different phenomena are connected, and how the inferential step can be made from 
one domain to another, also known as “bridge theory” (Botha 2003).
According to Botha however, the inferences involved in the case of the shell beads 
at Blombos cave lack suitable grounding and warranting on several levels (Botha 2008). 
He argues that in order for there to be evidence of fully syntactical language, there are 
several assumptions that are made which need to be better supported by evidence. For 
instance, what is the evidence that these beads are in fact symbols or representations at 
all, and if so why did the people who made them require a fully syntactical language to 
do so? Why couldn’t they have had a less evolved language and still have made these 
beads, or have no language at all and still have used symbols (Botha 2008, 206-207)? The 
steps taken in the argument to link beads to language are made clear by use of a 
schematic overview (fig 1). According to Botha, some of the bridging arguments (steps 
D and F) lack suitable grounding and warranting to connect the inferences made through 
them; such as the beads representing symbols (C to E) or the symbols requiring 
syntactical language (E to G); to be considered scientifically valid. 
For the “bead window” for instance, Henshillwood and colleagues argue that the 
beads are in fact symbols. They use definitions of the meaning of symbols to support 
there arguments. These state that “symbols are objects that have a meaning” (Botha 2008, 
203), “The meaning of symbols is assigned by arbitrary social conventions, tacit 
agreements, or explicit codes” (ibid., 203), and “Symbols make possible the storage and 
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display of information external to the human brain” (ibid., 203). Botha argues however, 
that for their argument to be valid they need to provide evidence of these symbol 
properties. The specific meaning these beads had to the Blombos Cave inhabitants would 
need to be specified, the social conventions, agreements or codes on which the meaning 
of these symbols was based would need to be provided, and the information that was 
stored through these beads would need to be given, all of which they fail to do. This 
leaves the inference of beads being symbols ungrounded.
Figure 1 Schematic overview of Henshilwood and d'Errico's argument (Botha 2008)
Both Wynn and Coolidge's strict standard and Botha's theory of groundedness and 
warantedness show the need for strong arguments and supporting evidence when making 
inferences on cognition. I believe that it is only through the application of such strict 
measures that we can make a truly sound cognitive argument in archaeology. I will 
therefore use these strict measures in my own analysis of the adhesive production process 
at Sibudu Cave, along with up to date and well-supported cognitive scientific theories, 
and apply them to the cognitive inferences that are made based on this production 
process. Archaeological validity will be assessed through an examination of the evidence 
given to support the inferences. These will be evaluated on whether they are up to date 
with current archaeological methods used to make these inferences. Cognitive validity 
will be assessed through several ways. An evaluating will be made of Wadley's 
understanding of the cognitive constructs she uses, based on their description and context 
use. The cognitive support for the constructs that are used will be analysed based on 
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references on the coming background review. Lastly, the necessity of the cognitive 
construct for the related behaviour will be analysed. This will provide a framework for 
my analysis of the Sibudu Cave adhesive manufacture.
2.3 When did sophisticated cognition evolve?
Despite all these problems, the question of how and when sophisticated human cognition 
evolved has been of interest to many researchers, and several attempts have been made to 
describe and trace human cognitive evolution throughout the past. These attempts have 
been based mainly on lists of traits seen in the archaeological record, originally those 
distinguishing Middle Palaeolithic (MP) and Upper Palaeolithic (UP) records in Europe. 
Some authors relate these traits to the appearance of certain types of behaviour (e.g. 
McBrearty and Brooks 2000). These behaviours are then used by some to imply changes 
in human cognition (e.g. McBrearty and Brooks 2000; Wynn and Coolidge 2009). The 
discussion in this area has gone mainly between people favouring a gradual evolution of 
“modern” behaviour and early cognitive change (McBrearty and Brooks 2000), and those 
that favour a more sudden and later onset (Bar-Josef 2003; Klein and Edgar 2002; Wynn 
and Coolidge 2009). 
Those in favour of a more revolutionary type of change argue that the transition 
from the Middle to the Upper palaeolithic reflects such a change in specific behaviour 
and material types, that is is likely that this was also the transition to sophisticated 
cognition as we know it today. Bar-Josef (2003) for example, has taken the side of the 
“human revolution”, claiming that many of the distinctly modern traits seen in the Upper 
Palaeolithic, such as standardization and variability in tool types, the exploitation of 
certain raw materials for ritual purposes, the use of body decorations and long distance 
exchange networks, were not present in the same way in the late Middle Palaeolithic. 
According to these researchers (Bar-Josef 2003; Klein and Edgar 2002; Wynn and 
Coolidge 2009), the changes in the Upper Palaeolithic occurred at a much more rapid 
pace than those seen in the Middle Palaeolithic, and therefore indicate a revolutionary 
change.
Others have argued for a more gradual change in behaviour and cognition 
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(McBrearty and Brooks 2000). According to them these former “revolutionary” findings 
are based on an incomplete record, as there is much less evidence from parts of Asia and 
Africa than from the European record, giving a clear bias to the sample. McBrearty and 
Brooks argue instead that this “revolution” was not a revolution at all, but a gradual 
change over time. According to them, many of the traits that some would describe as not 
occurring until the Upper Palaeolithic, such as specialized hunting strategies (McBrearty 
and Brooks 2000, 510) can actually be seen in parts of Africa much earlier than they are 
seen in Europe. They suggest that this set of behaviours did not occur suddenly, but was 
assembled over a period of 200 ka (McBrearty and Brooks 2000, 458) in Africa, and only 
later dispersed to neighbouring regions such as Europe. It is their belief that Africa has 
been dismissed as the source of complex behaviour because researchers have focused on 
trying to find a “human revolution” similar to the one supposedly seen in Europe during 
the transition from the late Middle palaeolithic to the Upper palaeolithic. According to 
McBrearty and Brooks this transition has been unjustly equated with the African 
transitional period between the Middle Stone Age and the Late Stone Age, when the two 
should not be so compared. The lack of such a revolution in Africa has been interpreted 
as lack of evidence for these changes, when according to the authors this is merely 
because the changes were much more gradual. 
Finds from Blombos cave in South Africa are used to support these claims of 
earlier “modern” behaviour in Africa. Two ochre fragments found at the site bear 
similarly engraved geometric patterns (Henshilwood et al. 2002), dated to around 77 ka, 
and according to d’Errico and colleagues suggest ritual use (d'Errico 2003). Recent 
evidence has shown a number of other MSA sites to also possess stone and ochre items 
with engraved pattern, supporting this claim (Henshilwood and Dubreuil 2011). 
McBrearty and Brooks make the valid argument that if this type of artifact is seen as 
evidence for “modern” behaviour in Europe, then the same interpretation must be made 
regarding the African finds. This would give the African record the earlier evidence of 
“modern” behaviour and cognition, as the dating on these fragments far precedes any 
found in European context.
Another theory supported by several researchers (d'Errico 2003, Conard 2007) is 
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the parallel and gradual development of cognition in different regions throughout the 
world. They suggest that different groups of hominins may have reacted in a similar way 
to comparable ecological conditions or pressures (d'Errico 2003). Through the course of 
this thesis, I will analyse if cognitive inferences made for Homo sapien cognition can also 
be applied to Neandertal cognition, assessing whether, for these constructs, cognitive 
development was similar.
The arguments that have been discussed so far have focused on the chronology 
and geographical origin of “modern” human behaviour. Another question is how the 
changes in the record can be explained. Both cognitive change and other processes 
provide possible explanations. Explanations in terms of cognition can be roughly divided 
into those based on symbolism and language, those based on Theory of Mind, those on 
modularity and working memory, and some alternative approaches. These different 
approaches will be discussed below.
2.4 Symbolism and Language
A heavy emphasis in much of the existing literature is placed on symbolism and language 
as a basis for sophisticated cognition and behaviour. Several researchers have argued that 
language and symbolism, though not equivalent, are nonetheless interconnected and are 
two of the main components of the evolution of the modern human mind (Deacon 1997, 
Tattersall 2009). Deacon (1996), for instance, has argued that the evolution of the human 
mind is mainly about the evolution of language, of which symbols are the essential 
element. He described symbols as “representations of social conventions, tacit agreement, 
or explicit codes that link to one another and are mediated by some formal or merely 
agreed upon link irrespective of any physical characteristics of either sign or object” 
(Deacon 1997, 70). He believes that the evolution of language can be explained through 
the acquisition and manipulation of these symbols and symbol-relations. Similarly, 
Tattersall (2009) has argued for the uniqueness of Homo sapiens in the natural world, 
specifically because of their possession and use of symbolic reasoning, while  other 
hominin species are argued have been far behind in this aspect.
One language construct that has been used to interpret archaeological data is that 
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of recursion. Recursion is the repeating of items in a self-similar way. In language it is the 
method of combining and restructuring sentences, while keeping their inherent meaning. 
Recursion has been central to many theories of language, most prominently those of 
Noam Chomsky (1959). The link has been made from language to tool use, arguing that 
the manipulation of objects can show structural and cognitive parallels to language, 
including recursion and concepts such as past and future (Haidle 2010), which is 
discussed in more detail in the following chapter. Though the importance of recursion in 
language has been challenged by some (Everett 2005), claiming that not all people use a 
language in which recursion plays an essential role, it has recently been shown through 
neurolinguistic studies to be supported by neurobiological brain structures that deal 
specifically with recursive language, which are present in all humans (Kaan et al. 2002).
The focus on language and mainly symbolism in explaining archaeological 
phenomena brings about several problems. One problem with using so-called symbols 
found in the archaeological record, is that because of their connection with language, they 
are often used to make inferences on it. Several authors (McBrearty and Brooks 2000) 
have noted however, that it is highly unlikely that the first signs of symbolism in the 
archaeological record actually coincide with the beginning of language. Indeed, others 
suggest that language probably developed much earlier in humans than it was manifested 
in their material culture (Henshilwood and Marean 2003). Though this is  important to 
remember, it a probably a generally unavoidable issue in cognitive archaeology.
A second problem is shown by Botha's (2008) critiques, namely the difficulty in 
extracting valid and scientifically founded conclusions from instances of so-called 
symbolism in the record, especially when attempting to make inferences on cognition. 
The bridging arguments for this line of reasoning need to be very strong and grounded in 
archaeological and cognitive evidence.
The problem with this emphasis on symbolism in archaeology and its relation to 
cognition is described in what Renfrew has termed “the sapient paradox” (Renfrew 
2008). A heavy emphasis is placed on symbolism as being the distinguishing 
characteristic of modern humans, even though there is evidence of modern human 
anatomy from 200 ka, whereas there is only evidence of modern human symbolism from 
27
77 ka at Blombos cave (Henshilwood 2004). If symbolism is truly the distinguishing 
characteristic of modern humans, and if, as Renfrew points out, it is indeed a genetic 
characteristic that is the cause of these changes to symbolic behaviour (Renfrew 2008), 
why then, do we not find earlier traces of it in the archaeological record? Though this 
might be a general problem in cognitive archaeology, related to the incomplete state of 
the archaeological record, it it still a valid point, and worth looking into. 
Klein has suggested (Klein 2001), in line with Wynn and Coolidge (2009), that 
this might be due to a genetic mutation that was not accompanied by any physical 
changes. If this mutation took place after the transition to anatomical modernity, this 
would explain the delay in cognitive sophistication, implying that anatomical modernity 
does not refer to cognition. Others have suggested that it might not be due to a single 
genetic mutation or occurrence, but due the gradual development of an increasingly 
symbolic way of thinking (Renfrew 2007), which would be more in line with the gradual 
development of modern behaviour proposed by McBrearty and Brooks (2000).
These explanations all still imply that symbolic reasoning is fundamental for 
cognitive sophistication. This is where cognitive archaeology and cognitive science 
diverge. Whereas cognitive archaeology still very much relies on these explanations of 
symbolism, cognitive science has increasingly started questioning this connection 
(Thelen and Smith 1993; Ballard 1991), and has since moved on to different explanations 
of cognitive complexity. 
According to cognitive science, the emphasis placed on symbolism relies on the 
belief that symbolism needs to be reflected in a physical or functional way through the 
use of material symbols, when that does not necessarily need to be the case (Thornton 
2012). Even though symbolism was long thought to be critical to complex cognition and 
integration (Marr 1977; Boden 1977; Winston 1984), the necessary neurological 
foundation to support this theory has not been found. Neurological research has shown 
that there is no executive centre in charge of the performance of symbolic reasoning 
(Clark 1997). The executive centre in the brain, a theorized cognitive system in charge of 
other cognitive processes, is responsible for cognitive mechanisms such as working 
memory, planning, attention, problem solving, multi-tasking, and mental flexibility (Chan 
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et al. 2008). These are all cognitive abilities that have been linked to modern cognitive 
sophistication (Coolidge and Wynn 2001, 2005, Wynn and Coolidge 2003). Symbolic 
reasoning has not been shown to have this type of neurological link to sophisticated 
cognition.
Research into artificial intelligence has shown that symbolic reasoning machines 
do not to have the same amount of power and fluidity as the modern human mind, even 
when capable of similar levels of symbolism (Clark 1997). This would imply that 
symbolism on its own is not a necessity for sophisticated cognition. Critics have made the 
point that approaches that focus on symbolic reasoning to explain cognition are 
philosophically flawed (Wheeler 2005). They are argued to be dependent on conceptual 
projection, i.e. requiring physical representations (Thornton 2012). Thornton makes the 
point that where a set of ideas is responsible for a certain behaviour, these ideas or 
behaviours do not need to have a physical representation (Thornton 2012; Wheeler 2005). 
Instead of looking purely at symbolism and its physical representations therefore, it is 
suggested that instead the focus should be on the underlying processes of symbolism.
More recent approaches in cognitive science underline the greater likelihood and 
neurological foundation of probabilistic (non-symbolic) forms of reasoning and 
information processing as the underlying factors in cognitive sophistication (Doya et al. 
2007; Chater and Oaksford 2009; Clark 2008). Instead of an increasing use of symbolic 
processing and representation, it looks at “increasingly predictive, increasingly well-
defined and increasingly broad generalizations” (Thornton 2012, 7), which allow for 
symbolism. Thornton argues that the concept of symbolism should be viewed differently, 
on a continuous scale, rather than as a static concept. He proposes that concepts can 
become more symbolic, and that as they do so, they become more abstract, well-defined 
and broad in generalization. When symbolism is then not directly linked to the use of 
material symbols, but merely seen as a product of the predictive, generalizing mind, it 
avoids the problem of having to explain the meaning of these symbols, which is one of 
the main problems when dealing with the idea of symbolism in cognitive archaeology. 
Thornton therefore underlines a definite need for reevaluation of cognitive archaeology's 
reliance on symbolic theory, a reevaluation of the concept of symbolism, and the 
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incorporation of more up to date cognitive scientific theories through more 
interdisciplinary work between the two fields. 
Though I agree with the need to reevaluate archaeology's reliance on symbolic 
theory, the problem with not linking symbolic ideas to actual physical representations of 
those ideas, but rather to abstract ideas, is that it would make it very hard to find any 
archaeological evidence to comment any further on the evolution of our cognition. 
Though it is necessary to stay up to date with cognitive science in order to create valid 
conclusions, the restriction inherent to the archaeological field might not allow us to 
follow al lines of modern cognitive science like these.
The above review has identified several issues when it comes to the use of 
symbolism and language in cognitive archaeology. Both concepts do not leave strong 
traces in the archaeological record, making them very hard to identify. Any traces that are 
found, are often so disputed that they need very strong evidence to back them up  in order 
to meet the criteria for archaeological validity. Especially when making inferences on 
cognition, these concepts need to be represented by exceptionally clear evidence for them 
to be warranted in inferring any cognitive capabilities. Though evidence of language use 
is hard to find archaeologically, it does have cognitive and neurological support for its 
importance as an aspect of sophisticated cognition. The same cannot be said for 
symbolism, which, though used frequently by archaeologists, had received more and 
more criticism from cognitive science as a construct for identifying cognitive 
sophistication. These issues often make any cognitive inferences made from language and 
symbolism speculative. I will therefore not be using these approaches in my analysis of 
adhesive production and comparison of cognitive capabilities of AMH and Neandertals. 
There are some alternative approaches to cognitive evolution other than language 
and symbolism however, two prominent ones being Theory of Mind and Modularity, 
which will be discussed presently.
2.5 Theory of Mind 
A different approach to the evolution of human cognition can be found in theories 
focusing on the concept of “Theory of Mind”. This term was coined during the 1970s 
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(Premack and Woodruff 1978) and refers to the ability to attribute mental states such as 
beliefs, intentions, desires and knowledge, not only to oneself, but also to others. It 
includes the understanding that others may not share the same beliefs and ideas as we do. 
It is often equated with the term “meta-representation”, or the ability to represent mental 
representations. This ability is often listed as one of the cognitive capabilities specific to 
modern human cognition (Amati and Shallice 2007; Barnard 2010). 
Research into chimpanzee behaviour has shown them also to have a partial 
Theory of Mind however. They have a basic understanding for instance of what others 
see and how this may influence their behaviour, though there is no evidence that they 
understand the beliefs of others, or concepts such as prior intentions, different 
perspectives, and attention (Tomasello et al. 2003). Though chimpanzee Theory of Mind 
may not be as developed as that of modern day humans, who do possess these aspects of 
Theory of Mind as well as the ones shared by chimpanzees, it does allow for the 
assumption that this reduced level of Theory of Mind was also present in our common 
ancestor (Kane 2004). 
This has allowed theories based on Theory of Mind to suggest a development of 
the concept throughout our evolutionary history. One such theory proposes that human 
cognition developed from a basic model regulating sensory input and output to one with 
many different subsystems, that represents fully modern cognition with all its abilities, 
including conceptual planning, Theory of Mind, an aesthetic sense and an algorithmic 
capacity, that supports productivity and learning (Barnard 2010). This theory has been 
used to support the claims of cognitive sophistication based on hafting adhesives created 
at Sibudu Cave, which will be discussed in more detail later.
Another theory, proposed by Robin Dunbar (1998) has suggested that Theory of 
Mind developed throughout evolution as a means to integrate groups more effectively 
through the use of language. Without Theory of Mind there would be no language in the 
form that we know today, as people would not be able to fully understand another 
person's intentions, and build a language filled with words describing concepts such as 
“intention”, “belief”, “idea” etc. (Dunbar 1998). This “social brain” hypothesis (Barton 
and Dunbar 1997) emphasizes the social function of the primate brain rather than the 
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ecological function, supported by the fact that primates appear more skilled at solving 
social problems than ecological ones (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990). Study has shown 
primates and humans to spend about 20% of their time in social interaction (ibid.). For 
primates this is done through grooming, and the time spent grooming has been shown to 
be correlated with their neocortex size and the size of their social group (Kudo et al. 
1999). Because of mankind's evolution to a larger brainsize, and thereby a larger 
neocortex size, this would increase human group size as well as their time spent 
grooming. The group size and grooming time of primates was therefore used to predict 
grooming time for humans with their increased neocortex and group size. This turned out 
to be around 40% of their time, much in excess of what would be possible in order to stay 
alive (Dunbar 1998). Dunbar suggests that Theory of Mind and language developed as 
mechanisms to deal more effectively with this increase in group- and brainsize, and that 
grooming was gradually replaced by “vocal-grooming-at-a-distance”, to allow for better 
time management (Aiello and Dunbar 1993). Dunbar proposes a date of 250 ka as the 
point in time where this change in grooming mechanism would have taken place, 
corresponding broadly with the emergence of our own species (Dunbar 1998). This 
theory would correspond with the findings of human having a more advanced Theory of 
Mind than chimpanzees (Tomasello et al. 2003).
This capacity is one that is well-defined and researched as well as supported by 
cognitive science. Though chimpanzee research would indicate that it is not a matter of 
presence or absence of Theory of Mind for Neandertals and AMH, the question can be 
raised if their levels of Theory of Mind were as advanced as those of modern day people. 
Though the concept could prove difficult for archaeologists to work with directly, as 
ideas, beliefs and intentions are unlikely to be clearly visible in the archaeological record, 
primate research could be very useful in determining the levels of Theory of Mind of past 
hominin species, adding to our knowledge of their cognitive capacities.
2.6 Modularity and Working Memory
Other theories regarding the evolution of human cognition have been based on a concept 
called modularity. This term was first used by Fodor in 1983 in his “modularity of mind” 
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theory, and refers to the idea that the mind is composed of independent, closed, domain-
specific processing modules. 
Cognitive fluidity is a term coined by Mithen (1996) in the nineties, and used in 
his model for human intelligence, based on the principal of modularity, where it 
represents the interaction of different forms of intelligence, allowing for original and 
creative thought, problem solving, information storage, abstract thought, metaphor, 
analogy and more (ibid.) This model is based on human a intelligence evolving through 3 
different phases, which Mithen (ibid.) compares to the structure of a cathedral. Phase one 
involves the basic framework of general intelligence, or the outer structure of the 
cathedral dome as described by Mithen(ibid.) This phase is evident in chimpanzees, and 
therefore most likely mirrors the intelligence of our common ancestor (ibid.). Phase two 
involves the evolution of different domains of intelligence surrounding the general 
intelligence, described by Mithen (ibid.) as separate alcoves in a cathedral, yet still not in 
direct contact with one another. These domains represent different forms of intelligence, 
namely: social intelligence, which deals with the interaction with other humans; technical 
intelligence, concerning the production and use of tools; natural history intelligence, to 
due with elements of the natural world relevant to us; and language intelligence (ibid.). 
Phase two can be seen, or at least inferred from the archaeological context, in early 
humans. In this phase, and according to Mithen (ibid.), early humans therefore did not 
have cognitive fluidity. This conclusion is based on analyses of environmental evidence, 
settlement patterns, hunting strategies and analyses of social, technical and linguistic 
accounts. It is only in phase three that the different domains come into contact with each 
other, and interaction between different forms of intelligence, known as cognitive fluidity, 
becomes possible. This phase, according to Mithen (ibid.), is seen only in anatomically 
modern humans, and can be witnessed through the combination of natural history 
intelligence and technical intelligence culminating in rock art, cave paintings, multi-
component tools and such. Other examples are ornaments, created through the 
combination of social and technical intelligence. As these are all elements seen mainly 
from around 50 kya onwards (ibid.), they have been subsequently associated with only 
anatomically modern humans AMH, thereby also linking cognitive fluidity with 
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anatomically modern humans.
This is contradicted however, by the wooden spears found in Schöningen, dating 
to 300.000 to 400.000  ka BP (Thieme 1999, 2005). As these spears have been found to 
require a specific woodworking technique (whittling), according to Mithens (1996) 
theory this should be a clear case of the crossing of domains (natural history and 
technical intelligence) (Haidle 2012). This would contradict Mithen's (1996) idea of 
cognitive fluidity only being present from around 50 ka BP onward.
Further criticism of Mithen's (1996) theory has been aimed at the lack of 
compelling evidence to support it. Critiques have regarded a lack of explanation as to 
why modularity should suddenly have broken down, and what the benefit was for the 
individual to no longer have a modular mind, especially after millions of years of it being 
assumingly beneficial to earlier hominin species (Sambrook 1999). Also questioned, is 
the storage of information in the modules and their lack of interaction up to phase three. 
A disregard for the possibility of knowledge being stored in more than one module is 
suggested. Bone, for example, could be stored in the natural history module, being part of 
an animal, and in the technical module, being a raw material for tool manufacture (ibid.). 
Further critique is aimed at the lack of any supporting evidence from neurological 
science. There has been no support found for any structures or regions on the brain being 
responsible for domain specific aspects of intelligence (McDermott 1997). Without this 
support, it remains an untested theory.
Another concept which has been explored within the evolution of cognition is that 
of working memory. Coined in the 1960's by Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960), it was 
first used in theories comparing the mind to a computer. The multi-component model of 
working memory as we now know it was proposed by Baddeley and Hitch in 1974. The 
construct of working memory is made up of 4 main components; a central executive 
component called the panmodal controller, a memory interface called the episodic buffer, 
a component for phonological storage, and a visual subsystem called the visuospatial 
sketch pad; it is a mental construct that refers to a general cognitive ability underlying 
important behaviours such as attention, intelligence, language acquisition, learning, 
memory, and several others (Wynn and Coolidge 2009, 216). Many of these cognitive 
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concepts have been linked to modern cognitive sophistication through executive function 
(Coolidge and Wynn 2001, 2005, Wynn and Coolidge 2003). Some researchers have 
created theories and models of cognitive evolution around the concept of working 
memory and how the many cognitive constructs involved in it came into being (Wynn 
and Coolidge 2009). Wynn and Coolidge for instance have proposed that a neural 
mutation led to an increase in working memory capacity, which in turn led to the 
development of these aspects of modern cognition and behaviour listed above (Wynn and 
Coolidge 2009). They argue that this is not at all a strange suggestion, as humans are in 
fact the products of a long history of genetic mutations and natural selection. They 
propose that it was not the single genetic event was the cause of instant changes to 
modern cognition but that it acted on a preexisting set of cognitive abilities that resulted 
in a marked change in behaviour towards what we now call “modern” behaviour. A less 
sophisticated cognitive technique suggested by Wynn and Coolidge (2007b) that may 
have been employed before this change in behaviour and cognition, is that of expertise 
through apprenticeship and learning, which will be discussed below.
Though executive functions play an important role in many theories of cognitive 
sophistication, the working memory model used by Wynn and Coolidge has been called 
into question by several cognitive psychologists (Barnard 2010; Beaman 2010; Engle 
2010; Martin-Loeches 2010). These critics focus mainly on the fact that there has been no 
convincing evidence tying cognitive indicators of modern cognition to an extension of 
working memory (Haidle 2010). Haidle (2010) underlines the fact that the evolution of 
working memory cannot be studied in the same manner as is used usually applied for 
neurological studies on living subjects however. She argues that in order to trace the 
development of executive brain functions such as working memory, archaeological 
material must be found in the record to support this, which is already limited (Haidle 
2007). A further problem is that the features of “modern” behaviour and cognition often 
named by archaeologists, that need to be tied to this extension, are too narrow and static 
to allow for proper tracking of these constructs on an evolutionary scale (ibid.).
Instead, Haidle (2010) suggests that a better way to measure the development of 
executive functions for the course of human evolution, namely that of measuring 
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cognitive complexity, flexibility and decision making through the concept of problem-
solution distance (Haidle 2010). She poses that tool behaviour, which has been 
recognized as an extension of indirect thinking (Kohler 1926), can be seen as an 
indication of the problem-solution distance (Haidle 2010). When tools are employed to 
solve a problem, the ultimate goal of for instance obtaining an item of food, must be 
temporarily set aside in favour of a temporary goal of finding a tool with which to 
accomplish this ultimate goal of finding food. According to Haidle (ibid.) this problem-
solution distance yields information on the cognitive flexibility of a species. Here she 
gives the example of a comparison between different animal species. Where some species 
are known to use tools for very specific purposes, such as birds using sticks to build a 
nest, others use tools for very varied purposes and in many different ways. Chimpanzees 
for instance, use a range of tools such as sticks, stones, leaves, twigs, and branches in 
order to obtain food, investigate their surroundings, to communicate, play, defend 
themselves, and more (ibid.). The more flexibility that is shown within this problem-
solution paradigm, the more decisions therefore need to be made on how to reach the 
desired goal (ibid.). 
According to Haidle (ibid.) this problem-solution distance is reflective of several 
general aspects of the executive functions of working memory such as planning, 
attention, decision making, flexibility, and the integration, comparing, processing and 
rehearsal of information. She argues that a similar comparison can be made for humans 
by looking at operational sequences of tools. More complex problem-solution units, such 
as are required for composite tools, are then reflective of further developed executive 
functions of working memory (ibid.).
Though evidence of an extension of working memory has not been found, 
Haidle's (2010) problem-solution paradigm could provide an alternative to future 
research on tracking the development of human cognitive functions. By comparing 
operational sequences of archaeological objects for different hominin species, one might 
be able to comment on the difference in problem-solution distance and accompanying 
levels of executive function and working memory. This approach will be kept in mind for 
the analysis of the AMH and Neandertal adhesive production processes in the coming 
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chapters.
2.7 Apprenticeship and Learning
An alternative model recently proposed by Wynn and Coolidge (2007b) as possibly 
having played a large part the history of tool proficiency, is that of apprenticeship and 
learning (ibid.). This model is based on the performance of certain actions through the 
construct of expertise. Expertise is described here as being “based on patterns and 
procedures that are held in long-term memory and that can be accessed quickly and 
deployed with a minimum of attention” (ibid., 45). Still one of the main problem-solving 
strategies used by people today, it is responsible for many learned behaviours, such as 
driving, playing a musical instrument (well), cooking, and many other actions that require 
practice. The main difference between expertise and other forms of problem solving is 
that it is learned through apprenticeship. Wynn and Coolidge have identified the main 
elements in apprenticeship to be procedural memories, which require great amounts of 
practice to learn fully (ibid.). These procedural memories are stored in what is known as 
long term working memory (LTWM) (ibid.). 
Unlike regular working memory, LTWM can hold information in storage for a 
longer period of time (ibid.). Using retrieval cues (items of knowledge linked to longer 
encodings of knowledge) (Ericsson and Kintsch 1995) people are able to encode and 
retrieve information very rapidly into LTWM. This type of information storage is only 
used by people within their areas of expertise though, and is not easily required. Ericsson 
(1995) has estimated a time span of around a decade to adequately learn the required 
technique in any field, not just to master the basic skills, but also to be able to handle any 
changes in circumstances that might occur during the process by drawing on a large store 
of internalized procedures and routines. Though this is a very flexible and powerful way 
of thinking, it a rather narrow domain, being limited to a person's area of expertise only 
(Wynn and Coolidge 2004).
Wynn and Coolidge (2004) illustrate this by looking at the practice of 
blacksmithing through a study performed by Kellar and Kellar (1996), which has been 
shown to rely on a roughly similar construction. In this study three main concepts are 
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used, namely “stock of knowledge”, “umbrella plan”, and “constellation” (Kellar 1996). 
Stock of knowledge refers to the entirety of knowledge held by the smith on materials, 
procedures, results, and visual and tactile information, as well as semantic 
knowledge(Wynn and Coolidge 2004). This, according to Wynn and Coolidge is 
comparable to the information stored in LTWM (ibid.). “Umbrella plan” is the smith's 
mental representation of the production process and final goal, including the exact 
procedures required to achieve that goal (ibid.). Umbrella plans include knowledge of 
materials, time, costs, as well as visual and tactile information (ibid.). Wynn and 
Coolidge (ibid.) have suggested that this umbrella plan also relies on retrieval cues, as 
they are formed according to the task at hand. The concept of “constellation” represents 
the “configurations of ideas, implements, and materials” (Keller and Keller 1996, 91) 
which account for the completion of one step in the production process. It includes the 
actual tools and materials required to reach this stage. According to Wynn and Coolidge 
(2004) these constellations are retrieval structures linked to tools and materials, which 
can access the required images and procudures, and can encode new knowledge into long 
term memory (ibid.)
Ethnographic work by Dietrich Stout (2002) on the adze makers of Langda, 
Indonesia gives a good example of the use of apprenticeship in modern times. It has 
shown people to be capable of creating well-shaped and extensively worked core forms 
through the application of apprenticeship and expertise. These tools are comparable to 
Acheulean handaxes and cleavers known from sites such as Kalambo Falls, Zambia 
(Clark 1969, 1974), Bodo, Ethiopia (Schick and Clark 2000), Lion Spring, Jordan 
(Copeland 1991), as well as Middle Stone Age core axes like those from the Central 
African “Lupemban” industry (Stout 2002). The making of these adzes is learned through 
a long-term process of apprenticeship, and requires not only fine perceptual-motor and 
strategic skills, but also an extensive knowledge of raw materials (ibid.). Obtaining these 
raw materials can be very difficult, as several different kinds are required, and are often 
difficult to identify to the un-apprenticed eye (ibid.). The knowledge of these raw 
materials and procedures can be equated to Ericsson's (1995) concept of “stock of 
knowledge”, whereas the strategic and perceptal-motor skills as well as the known 
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procedures can be seen as the “umbrella plan” or reliant on retrieval cues as suggested by 
Wynn and Coolidge (2004). Stout's work provides insights into the learning process, the 
duration of apprenticeship, and the social context of axe production for contemporary 
humans. These are all issues which are not easily retrieved from the archaeological 
record, and therefore can give us useful information which we are otherwise lacking.
Wynn and Coolidge (2009) have also identified Levallois stone tool reduction to 
show similar elements, such as a stock of knowledge, skill acquired through an extended 
period of practice, and elements comparable to an umbrella plan an constellation (ibid.).
Looking at the evolution of this problem-solving mechanism, primate studies have 
shown certain apes to also apply this technique (Toth and Schick 2009; Boesch and 
Boesch-Achermann 2000). Research into Bonobo tool proficiency has shown them to be 
capable of manufacturing stone tools through observation of human tool production (Toth 
and Schick 2009). Though they do not reach the skill of early human tool manufacturers, 
they are capable of limited stone tool production (ibid.). Further research into West-
African Taï chimpanzees has shown them to undergo a prolonged period of 
apprenticeship in order to gain the skill to crack open certain edible nuts (Boesch and 
Boesch-Achermann 2000). The learning period for this nut cracking skill ranges from 4 
to 7 years and is started during a very early age, when they observe their mothers 
cracking nuts with either stone or wooden hammers. They do not gain the required skill 
to crack the nuts until they have undergone several years of practice (ibid.).
Though this form of expertise and apprenticeship is perhaps not similar to that 
described by Wynn and Coolidge (2004) to be employed by skilled human experts of a 
craft, it does indicate the inherently human nature of the technique of apprenticeship 
itself. If this technique is used by bonobos, then is can be presumed to have been used by 
our common ancestor as well as later hominins species.
Whereas the evolution of AMH cognition has been linked by some (e.g. Wynn 
and Coolidge 2004) to the development of executive functions such as working memory, 
long-term planning, problem solving, mental flexibility and multi-tasking, Neandertal 
cognition has not. Though they are thought to have possessed flexible minds that were 
capable of responding adequately to changing conditions, the lack of development in tool 
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types, or indications of long-term planning or innovativeness have led Wynn and 
Coolidge to believe that Neandertals relied solely on the problem solving technique of 
expertise (ibid.). AMH on the other hand, are thought by these authors to have benefited 
from an enhanced form of working memory through a neural mutation (ibid.). According 
to them (ibid.) this mutation acted on their existing behavioural and cognitive abilities, 
leading to what we now call “modern” cognitive capacities. However, expertise has been 
shown to remain intact even when enhanced working memory capacity is removed 
(ibid.), showing that it does not rely on an equal amount of executive control.
Though this technique is still the most employed  problem-solving technique used 
today, and has been shown to be capable of producing items such as hafted spears (Wynn 
and Coolidge 2007b), it is not often called upon as a possible explanations for modern 
human behaviour in archaeological considerations. Though we now know modern 
humans to have at some point developed more sophisticated cognitive abilities, Occam's 
razor states that where two explanations are capable of producing a similar outcome, it is 
likely the simpler one that is responsible. As expertise has been shown not to be reliant on 
enhanced working memory (Wynn and Coolidge 2004), and its accompanying features of 
sophisticated cognition, it can be seen to count as the simpler explanation. This means 
that even though anatomically modern humans may have had more sophisticated 
cognitive abilities, we cannot assume they used them for the creation of certain 
archaeological artifacts. The possibility that expertise was used must be kept in mind as a 
possible explanation, as it will be for the course of this thesis.
2.8 Chapter conclusions
The above review has outlines several broad approaches to explain the evolution of 
human cognition and behaviour. Symbolism and language, though used in many of these 
explanations, was not only shown to be very hard to link to the archaeological record 
validly, but also to lack supporting evidence from cognitive and neurological science  in 
being critical to the development of cognitive sophistication. 
The Theory of Mind model was shown to also be difficult to detect aspects of 
archaeologically. Though it does not appear to be question of whether past hominin 
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species had a Theory of Mind, research could contribute to our knowledge of the extent 
of their mental capacities and Theory of Mind, through for instance primate research.
Modularity and working memory were shown to have different results. Mithen's 
(1996) model of modularity has received many critiques, including not having any 
support from cognitive neurological science, and not being in line with archaeological 
evidence. Explanatory models based on working memory have are supported by 
cognitive science, which recognizes working memory as a crucial construct to cognitive 
sophistication. Though Wynn and Coolidge's (2009) model of enhanced working memory 
has not received the required cognitive support tying cognitive sophistication to an 
enhancement of working memory, it has been suggested (Haidle 2010) that this is due to 
archaeologists' concepts for recognizing “modern”cognition being too static and narrow 
to accurately trace the development of concepts like working memory on an evolutionary 
scale. 
An alternative explanatory model could be found in Wynn and Coolidge's (2004; 
2007b) theory of expertise through apprenticeship and learning. It is a construct which 
has been shown to be employed as a problem-solving technique in modern day society as 
well as by bonobos and chimpanzees. This has the implication that past hominin species 
would have been capable of using this strategy as well, including AMH and Neandertals. 
A range of different capacities and models are used to interpret the evidence of 
Sibudu Cave hafting and adhesive production. These models and capacities fit within the 
broad approaches listed by this review. This chapter has provided a broad context and 
relevant information about the underlying cognitive constructs of these models and 
capacities, which will help me evaluate them more accurately.
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Chapter 3. Sibudu Cave,  South Africa: a case study
3.1 Chapter introduction
Having outlined some of the broad approaches used to explain the evolution of human 
behaviour and cognition, it is now time to look at the specific case study for which these 
approaches will form a background, namely that of AMH adhesive making at Sibudu 
Cave, South Africa. An analysis will be made of the hafting and adhesive making process 
performed at Sibudu Cave. The evidence for hafting and adhesive making as well as the 
cognitive inferences that are made based on this evidence will be checked for 
archaeological and cognitive validity. The key knowledge and procedures required for 
these inferred cognitive concepts will be outlined, to form a basis for later comparison 
with the Neandertal adhesive making process. Alternative approaches for explaining 
these key procedures and elements of knowledge will also be considered in the analysis.
3.2. Key trends and research questions in MSA South Africa
The South African Middle Stone Age (MSA) encompasses a period of some 250.000 
years, from 280 ka to around 50 to 25 ka (McBrearty and Brooks 2000). It is 
characterized by flake and blade tool industries that are distinguished by the presence of 
prepared core technology and unifacial and bifacial projectile points, and the absence of 
handaxes and microliths, the latter of which characterizes the subsequent Late Stone Age 
period (McBrearty and Brooks 2000). Though not as well researched as many European 
periods, it is represented by several noteworthy sites such as Blombos Cave, Pinnacle 
Point, the Klasies River Caves, and Sibudu Cave. The later periods of the South African 
MSA, ranging from around 80.000 BP to 26.000 BP (Wadley and Jacobs 2004), have 
been especially  noteworthy in recent research. They have provided much information 
regarding the behavioural and cognitive sophistication of the people that inhabited them. 
Evidence such as early use of ochre (Watts 2002), bone tool production (Klein 2000), and 
compound glue manufacture (Wadley 2010) have contributed greatly to recent 
discussions on the origins of modern behaviour, language, and  cognition sophistication.  
Once thought to be approximately equivalent to the European Middle Palaeolithic, 
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several finds from South African sites, such as the ones from Blombos Cave 
(Henshilwood 2002), have caused a reconsideration of that idea (McBrearty and Brooks 
2000). Many now consider the African MSA to represent the world's first symbolic 
culture and visual art forms. This has in turn been linked to the first indication of 
language by modern humans (Henshilwood et al. 2004); however, as we have seen 
(Botha 2008) not everyone is in agreement on this issue.
Due to the controversy surrounding the meaning and importance of symbolism 
with regard to cognition in recent research, some researchers have shifted their focus 
from symbolic indications to indications of complex technological behaviour to imply 
sophisticated cognition (e.g. Wadley 2010). A good example of this type of complex 
technological behaviour can be found at Sibudu Cave, in the Kwazulu-Natal region of 
South Africa. Extensive research on this site has been performed by Lynn Wadley since 
1998; specifically, and most important for the content of this thesis, she has tried to 
connect the indications of compound glue manufacture at the site, to a level of cognitive 
sophistication in its creators which is similar to that of modern humans. Though no 
human remains have been found at Sibudu Cave, the similarity of the tool assemblage to 
other sites in the regions such as Blombos Cave and Hollow rock shelter (Wadley 2007), 
some of which have been linked to AMH through human remains (Grine and 
Henshilwood 2002), clearly indicate that the creators of the Sibudu Cave adhesives were 
also Homo sapiens.
3.3 Site description
The site of Sibudu Cave is located in the northern part of the Kwazulu-Natal region of 
South Africa (fig 2). About 15 kilometers inland from the Indian ocean, it is situated on a 
cliff top overlooking the Tongati river. The cave itself is about 55 meters long and 18 
meters wide, and was formed by the river eroding the sandstone cliff now situated above 
it, during a lowering of its channel some 160 to 140 ka BP (Maud 2000). 
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Figure 2 The location of Sibudu Cave (Wadley 2006)
Clear stratigraphy and good organic preservation of bone, seeds and charcoal in the layers 
have allowed for optimal analysis through environmental reconstruction and techniques 
such as optically stimulated luminescence (OSL) dating (Wadley and Jacobs 2004).
The site has shown a range of MSA occupational phases (fig 3), from a Pre Still 
Bay phase coming up from the rock base (lacking bifacial points), to a Still bay industry 
(>70 ka, mainly bifacial points), a Howiesons Poort phase (>60 ka, backed tools and 
segments), and even late and final MSA industries (Wadley 2004), with research still 
being conducted. These analyses have shown the cave site to have been occupied 
throughout a large part of the MSA, with inhabitants of the cave being skilled hunters in 
an area with a very diverse animal population (Plug 2004).
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Figure 3 Diagram of the stratigraphy on the Northern wall of the Sibudu Cave test pit (Wadley 
2006).
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The time period under discussion for this particular case study lies around 70 ka BP, and 
places the current discussion most likely in the Still Bay or Howiesons Poort period. 
Figure 3 shows the occupational layers seen through the north wall of the test pit at 
Sibudu Cave. The layers under discussion for this thesis (60 ka and older) are represented 
in figure 3 by layers BS up to, and including, GR. Early OSL dates for the Sibudu Cave 
Still Bay sequence seems to place it on a line with the Blombos cave Still Bay industry 
(Jacobs et al. 2006). For Sibudu Cave, this is represented by a stone tool industry with 
many bifacial points, and some backed tools (Wadley 2010). The assemblages consists 
mainly of flakes rather than blades, of which there are far less, and only has a few worked 
cores. This is in contrast with the succeeding Howiesons Poort period, which is 
represented by many backed tools and segments, but lacks points (Wadley 2007). The 
good bone preservation has shown the presence of mainly smaller animals such as birds, 
reptiles and rodents, but also marine products such as mussels, and some larger bovids 
are represented (Wadley 2007). 
Analysis of the tools found at Sibudu Cave indicate that hafting took place during 
several different phases of occupation. Plant gum residue found on several of the tools 
have led the researchers  to conclude that adhesive was manufactured as one of the 
methods for hafting these tools. According to McBrearty and Brooks (2000) hafting was 
probably routinely used in MSA contexts. They point out that MSA points are often 
deliberately modified to facilitate hafting through thinning at the butt or the fabrication of 
tangs. 
Indications of the use of adhesives are not new to the archaeological record. 
Traces of adhesives used for hafting have been found dating to around 200 ka Campitello 
Quarry, Italy (Mazza et al. 2006), 120 ka at Inden-Altdorf, Germany (Pawlik and Thissen 
2011), 80 ka in Königsaue, Germany (Koller, Baumer and Mania 2001), and 40 ka at the 
site of Umm el Tlel in Syria (Boeda 1996).
Wadley has argued however, that these finds are examples of the use of “simple, 
1-component” adhesives (Wadley 2009, 9590), whereas the adhesives used at Sibudu 
Cave can be considered to be compound adhesives, which require a more sophisticated 
production process. This adhesive production process calls for certain cognitive skills that 
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are unique to the modern human mind, and thus points to the cognitive sophistication of 
the Sibudu inhabitants. Along these lines, she has suggested that the creators of these 
adhesives had modern cognitive sophistication. In order to analyse this assumption 
properly we must first look at the evidence for adhesive manufacture at Sibudu Cave and 
its production process. 
3.4 Evidence of hafting
Macrofracture analysis performed through low-power microscopy, along with 
microscopic analysis of use-wear patterns, was performed on tools from the Still Bay, 
Howiesons Poort and post Howiesons Poort complexes at Sibudu Cave (Lombard 2005). 
Five main categories of microscopic traces have been shown to be relevant to identifying 
hafting on lithic tools: polish, edge damage, edge-rounding, striations and bright spots 
(Rots 2002). These categories were used as markers in the analysis of the Sibudu Cave 
stone tools. Residue analysis for similar samples were performed through optical residue 
recognition (Lombard 2005). 
A small sample of tools (n=11) was analysed to interpret the evidence for hafting 
for the Sibudu Still Bay industry (Lombard 2006). Two of these tools showed clear 
indications of having been hafted through signs of polish, edge rounding and striations. 
Ochre, resin, plant and fat residue on these tools were also seen to be clear indications of 
hafting. Several other of these tools showed similar adhesive residues and use-wear 
traces, but these were not as clear as the first two, and no definite conclusions as to 
hafting could be drawn. The preliminary interpretations drawn from these analyses is that 
at least the two tools with clear hafting signs were used as butchery implements.
Micro-residue analysis was performed on a small sample (n=8) of backed stone 
tools from the Howiesons Poort layers at Sibudu (Delagnes et al. 2006). Resin deposits 
were found at the end of several tools, along with small traces of ochre on three of the 
tools. Two of the tools showed further traces of wood and plant residue mixed with the 
resin. Retouch found on the back of several segments are also consistent with hafting 
procedures (Wadley 2010). Conclusions drawn from this analysis is that these backed 
stone tools were hafted with the aid of a resinous substance.
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Analysis of the post Howiesons Poort tools also delivered several lines of 
evidence for the hafting of points at Sibudu Cave (Lombard 2005). A sample of 50 
bifacial and unifacial points and point fragments was used for the analysis. Macro-
fracture analysis showed signs of bending fractures and proximal crushing, regarded as 
signs of hafting, and indicated 42% of the examined tools to have diagnostic impact 
fractures consistent with hafting. Use-wear analysis showed further signs of edge-
rounding, edge damage, polish and longitudinal striations on many of the tools, also 
suggestive of the point having been hafted. Residue analysis showed vegetal and plant 
fibre residue on many of the tools, leading to the suggestion that fibrous plant material 
was used as a binding agent for the hafting of these tools. Resin and wood residue was 
also found on most of the tools, almost all on the proximal ends, consistent with the use 
of resin as an adhesive material. Analysis of the position of the glue on the tools suggests 
that they may have been hafted in a variety of positions (Lombard 2007, 2008).
Wadley further argues the the link between stone point and hafting to be valid due 
to the wide acceptance of stone points being tips of spears in the African MSA and 
European and Middle Eastern palaeolithic (Shea 2006).
These analyses have led the authors to conclude that hafting was definitely being 
employed as a technique at Sibudu Cave, and that this was done not only through binding 
with fibrous material, but also through the use of resin based adhesives made up of 
several ingredients such as plant gum, ochre, fat, and beeswax (Wadley 2010).
These arguments have been analysed with respect to their validity as indications 
that the people living at Sibudu Cave were indeed employing the techniques of adhesive 
making and hafting (Wynn 2009). Borrowing from Wynn's adapted version of Botha's 
previously introduced schematic argument, the groundedness and warantedness of the 
above arguments are analysed. This places us in step B of the schematic overview (fig 4), 
leading to the question if the bridging argument B, in this case the evidence presented in 
the form of residue analysis, macrofracture patterns, and use-wear analysis, is valid in 
connecting A, the stone tools, to C, the conclusion of hafting having been used.
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Figure 4 Wynn's (2009) adapted form of Botha's (2008) schematic argument.
Wynn has analysed the argument for hafting at Sibudu Cave through the structure of 
Botha's critique. He has concluded that because the inference of hafting was based on 
analyses of macro-fractures, use-wear analysis and microscopic residue analyses, and the 
results corresponded with signs of hafting, that the argument was indeed grounded (Wynn 
2009). The fact that the techniques that were used are well established archaeological 
methods for the indication of hafting, has led him to conclude that the argument is also 
clearly warranted (Wynn 2009). The multitude and depth of analyses performed on the 
Sibudu Cave tools leads me to agree that the argument for hafting is indeed well-founded 
and valid.
In his analysis Wynn states that the condition of equifinality must also be taken 
into account. This concept indicates that the same outcome can be produced through 
different methods. If this is the case, Wynn (2009) states that archaeologists should 
conclude that it was probably the one that is technically easiest that is most likely to have 
been used. If it could be demonstrated therefore that the residue and wear on the stone 
points could have been caused by a different, easier, technique that did not involve 
hafting, then a re-evaluation of the conclusions as to hafting would be necessary (Wynn 
2009). However, it seems that the evidence for hafting is fairly strong in this case.
3.5 Production Process
The information in the next four sections concerning the production sequence of the 
adhesives made at Sibudu Cave and their ingredients are taken from the published work 
of Wadley described in her recent articles (Wadley 2010; Wadley 2009; Wadley 2005b). 
This is based on the residue, macro-fracture and use-wear analyses discussed above and a 
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series of experiments. An overview will be given of the required ingredients and the steps 
involved and described by Wadley for the production of these adhesives. Looking once 
again at Botha's diagram (fig 4), this places us at bridging argument D, leading to the 
question of whether the procedures and knowledge described in the coming section, are 
indeed required for the technical system employed, in this case hafting. This step is 
shown more clearly in figure 5 below.
                                                                               
                                                                             Procedures and Knowledge  
        Technical system:                                          e.g. - knowledge of ingredient qualities,  
      Adhesive production                                                -procedures of mixing of ingredients, 
             & Hafting                                                            fire building, drying. 
                                                                                       -problem solving, anticipation,
                                                                                        adaptation, abstract concepts.
Figure 5  Wadley's inferential step from technical system to procedures and knowledge, based on 
Wynn's (2009) adapted form of Botha's (2008) schematic argument.
3.5.1 Ingredients
The residue analysis performed on the Sibudu Cave points and segments revealed several 
different mixtures of adhesives that may have been used for hafting. These adhesives 
consisted of different ingredients, possibly used for different purposes. Besides the plant 
gum or resin, several of the MSA segments also had ochre stains on the backed edges, 
suggesting ochre may have been part of the adhesives. Traces of fat and wax were also 
found in some of the residues, which were also possibly a part of the mixture. 
Different mixtures may have been used to produce different results. The use of 
mere plant gum or resin, without any extra ingredients, has been shown to create a brittle 
adhesive that cannot resist high pressures (Rots 2002). Points that are hafted onto shafts 
would break off on impact (Crombe et al. 2001). This could have been favourable if the 
end-product was used as a throwing spear, the tip would break off inside the animal, 
leaving the haft intact to be re-used, and causing more eventual damage to the animal. 
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More robust mixtures made up of a combination of several ingredients could have been 
used in spears that needed to be able to withstand high pressure impact, such as hand-held 
thrusting spears (Wadley 2010).
With the ingredients known, Wadley has attempted to recreate these adhesives, 
and has described the process in her 2010 publication. For her experimental approach she 
chose to carry out her experiments in a context that did not differ much from the 
(probable) original context, rather than in laboratory circumstances. Before starting the 
actual production process, she first gathers all the ingredients necessary to replicate these 
adhesives; firewood, wood for handles or shafts, rocks and a hammer stone for the 
knapping of the points, hematite nodules and some coarse grained flat rocks to grind 
ochre powder, tree resin from the Acacia karroo tree, and leaves for twine. Wadley 
underlines the large amount of time and planning involved in the gathering of all these 
different ingredients.
3.5.2 Processing of ingredients 
Prior to creating the actual adhesive, the main ingredients need to be processed in order to 
be used in the adhesive production. For the stone, this was shown to involve the knapping 
of the stone to cut the wood into shafts and creating stone  inserts that could be hafted 
onto the shafts. The wood had to be cut into shafts while wet, and dried for a week before 
it was ready to use. The hematite nodules were ground into ochre powder on the coarse 
slab of rock. In the process of grinding, coarse particles of the stone are mixed with the 
ochre powder, giving it extra structure and lending strength to the final product. 
3.5.3 Simple adhesives 
The production process Wadley describes involved the making of several different 
mixtures of adhesives. A distinction is made between “simple” adhesives, made from just 
1 component, and “compound adhesives”, made of 2 or more components. The simple 
adhesives are made using acacia gum alone. Not much information is given regarding the 
exact process of the making of this adhesive, but rather about its properties and 
workability. 
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The gum is shown to have variable consistency, drier ones being more easily 
workable, and runny ones being stickier and more difficult to work with. Dry gum needs 
no further processing besides air-drying, whereas sticky gum needs to be dried over a fire 
and rotated constantly to keep the adhesive from dripping off the haft or stick. When 
sufficiently dried so that it can be molded around a haft and tool, it still needs to be 
rotated every half minute while drying next to the fire to keep the stone tool from coming 
loose from the adhesive. Both the drier and more sticky variants result in a brittle product 
that is not resistant to high pressure, and can crumble on impact. Without any additives 
resin is also water-soluble, causing it to become stickier again in damp conditions and 
release the stone insert from the haft. Microscopic analysis also showed plant inclusions 
to be present in the adhesives, though this was probably caused while scraping the gum 
from the Acacia trees, and does not imply purposeful admixture of plant products 
(Wadley 2010).
This simple adhesive appears therefore to be quite easy to make, depending on the 
starting quality of the gum, and can be useful in certain circumstances (where the tip is 
meant to break off for instance), but is rather unreliable.
3.5.4 Compound adhesives
The compound adhesives are made using the ingredients identified in the residue analysis 
above, the main ingredient still being acacia gum, mixed with smaller amounts of ochre 
and in some cases beeswax. The added ochre works to bind the acacia gum into a more 
workable substance. The drier gum was shown to need less added ochre powder than the 
stickier kind. To increase the binding effect, the hematite nodules were ground on a rough 
sandstone, creating a mixture of fine ochre powder and coarser sandstone grains. Earlier 
experiments by Wadley have shown mixtures that did not have the  mixed grain-size 
element to fail, making the grinding on rough slabs essential. These types of coarse 
sandstone slabs have also been found at Sibudu Cave. Of course this doesn’t necessarily 
mean they used them for this purpose. Wadley states however, that if they did not in fact 
use them to grind the ochre for the adhesives, they would have needed to add sand to 
coarsen the mixture, or it would not have been strong enough to use as a hafting material. 
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The mixing of the ingredients is described by Wadley as requiring “complete, undivided 
attention”(Wadley 2010, 115). Evaluation of the qualities of the ingredients (how runny 
the resin is, how coarse the ochre particles etc) is needed in order to estimate the correct 
quantities and to adjust them correctly when required. The added advantage of adding 
ochre powder to the acacia gum, besides increasing the strength and workability of the 
mixture, is that the resulting adhesive is not water soluble. Unlike the simple adhesive, it 
will not re-soften in damp circumstances. This also means that the adhesive cannot be 
reheated and re-used, nor can the ingredients be separated once mixed. The process is, as 
Wadley (2010) states, irreversible. 
A small amount of beeswax was added to some of the mixtures, giving the 
resulting adhesive a higher degree of plasticity. When too much beeswax was added 
however, the product shrank when it dried, releasing the stone tool from its haft in the 
process. To obtain the desired amount of plasticity, cohesiveness, and workability, only 
15% of the total weight in beeswax was needed. The adding of ochre and/or beeswax 
lessens the time the mixture needs to dry and harden. 
When making the adhesive, the quality of the wood, the fineness of the ochre 
powder when ground, the consistency of the beeswax, fat and acacia gum would all have 
varied with each production sequence. People would not have been able to rely on a fixed 
recipe to create this adhesive properly. Had they been able to use such a recipe, they 
would not need to have been mindful of the changes and adjustments required to produce 
a working adhesive. As these ingredients did all vary however, they would have had to 
pay close attention to changes in quality and quantity in order to produce a working 
adhesive. Besides natural differences in the raw materials, their own actions would also 
have required attention, and the quantities that were used and subsequent consistency of 
the adhesive mixture would have required adjustment if any of the products had not been 
used in the correct amount relative to its counterparts.
Wadley has emphasized the significance of the addition of these extra ingredients. 
Whereas acacia gum has natural adhesive-like qualities and can therefore be used as glue 
instinctively by people, the added materials of ochre, beeswax and fat have no such glue-
like attributes. She argues that there would have been no obvious natural reason to add 
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these ingredients to the mixture. Though fat and beeswax are both sticky, contradicting 
this statement, ochre is definitely not, and nonetheless did help to strengthen the 
adhesives along with the other ingredients. Not only did the people creating this adhesive 
have to know the right amounts and combinations however, they also had to alter the 
mixture chemically through fire. 
The time it takes the adhesives to dry depends not only on the mixture itself 
however, but also on the method of drying itself. When dried by a fire, while being 
rotated approximately every 10 minutes, a tool could be used after 3 to 4 hours. At this 
point Wadley (2010) points out the necessity of careful judgement and attention to the 
task, though this was likely the case for the simple adhesives as well. She describes 
several attempts at drying the adhesives where the task failed and the end-product was 
not usable. Adhesives that are heated too rapidly can start to boil, causing cracks and 
weaknesses, so that the tool does not set securely. The mixture can also swell, causing the 
crust to char, and air bubbles to form under the surface. This also weakens the adhesive 
and can cause the tool to fall from its grip. Wadley (2010) describes this process as 
requiring “vigilance, keen judgement, and an understanding of the feel and appearance of 
the end product” (Wadley 2010, 115). 
When air-dried, it takes 6 days for the adhesive to set and harden enough for the 
tool to be used without breaking. Drying the adhesive by a fire speeds up the process 
significantly. It was therefore shown to be possible to avoid the fire-drying stage of the 
adhesive production, but it certainly has major time advantages over air-drying. 
The production process is well described in general. Ingredients are listed, 
different mixtures are shown, along with their advantages and disadvantages. Successful 
and failed attempts at creating a useful adhesive are described, as well as the general 
manner in which these attempts were performed. What it lacks however, is an exact 
description of the duration of the processes involved, and the exact steps taken to perform 
them. We get an overall description of the acts that are performed, but a more precise 
account would help in determining what exactly would have needed to be done by past 
people, and what the involved timespan would have been, in order to create these 
adhesives. The procedure involved in obtaining the resin used in the production process 
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would have been useful for instance. Especially considering the implications that are tied 
to these production steps, they need to be very precisely specified. 
3.6 Key procedures and knowledge
In order to allow for a better analysis of the cognitive concepts inferred by Wadley 
through the elements of the production process, it is necessary to list the key procedures 
and knowledge involved in this process. The key element of knowledge required for the 
adhesive making process include the following: 1. knowledge of the natural surrounding 
in order to find the different raw materials. 2. knowledge of the qualities of the raw 
materials themselves in order to know to use them in adhesive production and to be able 
to measure and adjust their quantities properly. 3. knowledge of the technical procedures 
of fire making and composite tool production. 4. knowledge of abstract concepts such as 
workability, plasticity, irreversibility, past, future. 5. Knowledge of the techniques of 
keeping and switching attention, anticipation, adapting to changing circumstances, and 
problem solving. The key procedures involved in the adhesive production process include 
the following: 1. Gathering the raw materials. 2. Processing and mixing of the raw 
materials into the adhesive mixture. 3. Working the adhesive onto tools. 4. Drying and 
chemically altering the adhesive over a fire. An overview of the procedural steps in the 
adhesive production process can be seen in figure 6 below.
All-in-all however, considering Botha's diagram once again, it does seem that the 
knowledge, preparation and procedures involved in the production of these adhesives is 
so elaborate, as shown by experimental reproduction, that without them, it would be very 
difficult indeed to haft stone tools with the use of compound glues such as the ones 
produced at Sibudu Cave. This type of hafting therefore does appear to require the 
procedures and knowledge specific to step E, making the bridging argument D grounded 
in evidence, and also warranted to imply the procedures and knowledge of step E.
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  Gathering of         Processing of                 Mixing                  Working                 Drying and 
  raw materials        raw  materials                   of                     adhesive onto           chemically
                                e.g. grinding               ingredients                  tools                 altering adhesive
                                      ochre                                                                                       over fire
                                                                                                                                                      
Figure 6 Flow chart of the AMH adhesive making process
3.7 Cognitive prerequisites
Wadley goes on to link the steps in this production sequence to elements of modern 
cognition. She argues that several of these steps require cognitive sophistication at a level 
equal to that of modern humans in order for them to be performed. Looking at Botha's 
diagram (fig 4), this places us at bridging argument F, linking the procedures and 
knowledge involved in producing the compound adhesives of step E, to the cognitive 
prerequisites of step G, as shown in figure 7 below. The cognitive processes or abilities 
that are suggested to be involved in the production sequence include enhanced working 
memory (Wynn and Coolidge 2005), fourth-order abstraction (Barnard 2010), multi-level 
operations and non-routine thought (Amati and Shallice 2007),mental rotation (Kane et  
al. 2004), embedded recursion (Haidle 2010, Reuland 2010), and cognitive fluidity 
(Mithen 1996). I will assess both the choice of cognitive models and whether they are 
supported by cognitive science, as well as how well Wadley's data on the procedures and 
knowledge involved in the production sequence can be shown to be connected to aspects 
of these cognitive models. Through the application of both Botha's (2008) structural 
argument and Wynn and Coolidge's (2009) strict standard I will attempt to comment on 
the groundedness, warantedness and cognitive and archaeological validity of these 
inferences.
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    Procedures and Knowledge   e.g.:                            Cognitive Prerequisites
   - knowledge of ingredient qualities,                                 -(Enhanced working memory)
   - procedures of mixing of ingredients,                                -Fourth-order abstraction
     fire building, drying,                                                         -Embedded recursion
    -problem solving, anticipation,                                          -Mental rotation
      abstract concepts                                                              -Multi-level operations and 
                                                                                                 non-routine thought
                                                                                                -Cognitive Fluidity
 
Figure 7 Wadley's inferential step from procedures and knowledge, to cognitive prerequisites, 
based on Wynn's (2009) adapted form of Botha's (2008) schematic argument.
3.7.1 Enhanced Working Memory
The concept of enhanced working memory was proposed by Wynn and Coolidge (2005), 
and builds on the construct of working memory as proposed by Baddeley and Hitch 
(1974). As discussed in the previous chapter, the concepts of working memory is tied to 
executive functions of the brain, which in turn is an aspect of modern cognitive 
sophistication, and in charge of elements such as planning, attention, problem solving, 
multi-tasking and mental flexibility (Chan et al. 2008). Working memory itself is 
responsible for constructs such as attention, intelligence, language acquisition, learning 
and memory (Wynn and Coolidge 2009, 216). Wynn and Coolidge have proposed that a 
neural mutation in AMH led to an enhancement of working memory, which in turn led to 
the aspects of cognitive sophistication we know today.
Wadley's starting point for this argument lies in the qualities of the ingredients that 
are used for the production of the adhesive. She argues that the combining of these 
seemingly unrelated materials and the subsequent making of the adhesive can be equated 
with the practice of alloying metals or firing ceramics. She argues that the underlying 
cognitive processes involved in these two practices can also be equated. These practices 
require a similar process of collecting and combining raw, seemingly unrelated 
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ingredients, and transforming them irreversibly into a useful end product. This 
irreversibility is significant because it implies that the makers of the adhesive could not 
correct their mistakes once the adhesive had been completed.
These practices have been shown by Wynn and Coolidge to be examples of 
techniques that depend on executive functions of the brain, which in turn depend on 
capabilities linked to frontal lobe activity (Wynn and Coolidge 2006, 2007). They have 
argued that these techniques are examples of technologies that provide evidence for 
remote action and contingency planning, employing the phonological loop and central 
executive aspects of working memory, thereby providing evidence for enhanced working 
memory (Wynn and Coolidge 2005).
Though Wadley (2010) does not make the specific inference that the makers of the 
Sibudu Cave adhesives had enhanced working memory, her equation of the production 
process with the techniques of alloying metals and firing ceramics, which in turn have 
been linked to enhanced working memory, makes a similar inference. Through this 
comparison Wadley argues that the process of adhesive making, also calling for problem 
anticipation, ideas about future actions, and prepared responses and adjustments; was 
equally representative of complex cognition as the techniques of alloying metals or firing 
ceramics. 
Though this seems a valid equation, the are still several problems with the 
enhanced working memory theory itself that stand in the way of the bridging argument 
for this inference having cognitive validity. As discussed in the previous chapter, Wynn 
and Coolidge's (2005) enhanced working memory model has been called into question 
due to the fact that there has been no convincing evidence found to tie cognitive 
indicators of sophistication to an extension of working memory. This implies a lack of 
cognitive validity for the concept. Because working memory is a broad construct, 
responsible for elements such as attention, intelligence, language acquisition, learning 
and memory (Wynn and Coolidge 2009, 216), it is hard to provide archaeological validity 
for an advancement of such a construct. Elements of the construct such as attention can 
be successfully argued to have been present during adhesive production, but  indications 
of the enhancement of such a construct would require evidence that these concepts are 
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somehow more advanced than during a previous period, requiring a temporal 
comparison. As this does not fall within the scope of this thesis, archaeological validity 
cannot be proven to be intact.
Haidle's (2010) proposed problem-solution paradigm might present a way in 
which the development of working memory can nonetheless be investigated, as it does 
not rely on standard archaeological traits of cognitive sophistication. While perhaps not 
being able to comment directly on their level of working memory capacity, it might be 
able to provide information on the  possible differences in level between AMH and 
Neandertals working memory and executive function, through a comparison of the 
elaborateness of their adhesive production sequences. For AMH, the flow chart shown in 
figure 6 illustrates the steps taken in the production sequence and thereby the problem-
solution distance for the creation of the adhesives made at Sibudu Cave. This operational 
sequence can be used in a comparison with that of Neandertals in the following chapter.
3.7.2 Fourth-order abstraction 
The concept of fourth-order abstraction deals with the ability to employ meta-
representation, or in other words the representation of mental representations. The term 
meta-representation is often used synonymously with Theory of Mind, and is used to 
describe the cognitive capability of attributing mental states such as knowledge, beliefs, 
intents, desires and thoughts to yourself and to others, with the knowledge that these 
mental states might vary per person, and may or may not correspond with the actual 
world itself. The idea of fourth-order abstraction derives from Barnard's (2010) model of 
working memory and cognition. This model describes the evolution of human cognition 
through the continuous adding of elements, or subsystems. It starts with a four subsystem 
model that deals with basic sensory input and output, and ends with a nine subsystem 
model that represents fully modern cognition with all its abilities; including conceptual 
planning and Theory of Mind, an aesthetic sense, and algorithmic capacity, and abstract 
thought; and supports productivity and learning (ibid.). The adding of elements thus 
represents steps in the evolution of human cognition through time. Fourth-order 
abstraction comes into play only after the ninth subsystem is in place, and is therefore 
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also representative of fully developed cognitive sophistication (ibid.). Barnard has 
described these fourth-order abstractions as being comparable to feelings of intuition or 
wisdom (ibid., 51).
Wadley (2010) has proposed that fourth-order abstraction is shown to be present 
in the adhesive production process at Sibudu Cave. She argues that the combining of 
different materials, all having different qualities that need to be carefully considered 
before each adhesive production, and the consequent need for constant evaluation, 
anticipation, and adjustment, is unlikely to have been possible without a certain level of 
intuition, and abstractions to explain concepts such as stickiness, workability, 
consistency, viscosity, plasticity, temperature, shrinkage, past, future, and irreversibility.
It is quite hard to imagine creating an adhesive without the help of these terms, 
especially as anyone attempting to recreate the process today would have knowledge of 
the meaning of these concepts. People creating such adhesives would undoubtedly have 
benefited from the understanding and use of these abstractions, but there are nonetheless 
a few problems with this implication. 
The main problem lies with a technical aspect of the subsystem model proposed 
by Barnard (2010). In order for the conclusion to be drawn that people at Sibudu Cave 
had a nine-subsystem mental architecture, thereby being equivalent to modern cognitive 
sophistication, fourth-order abstractions (the use of abstract ideas and  the ability to 
express them through language) had to have been used. Up till now however, bridging 
evidence for this conclusion is lacking. As suggested by Barnard, further research 
involving novices that are instructed with and without the help of abstract concepts could 
provide this evidence in the future (ibid.). 
Going back to Botha's diagram therefore, it seems that the bridging argument F is 
lacking the power to connect the procedures and knowledge of E (switching of attention, 
evaluation, adjustment etc) to the cognitive prerequisites in G, in this case fourth order 
abstraction. It fails to meet the criteria for the requirement of warantedness, and as such 
does not have cognitive validity required for Wynn and Coolidge's strict standard (2008). 
Though Barnard's theory in itself has support from cognitive science, in order for it to 
have cognitive validity in this situation, it must be shown that abstract concepts were not 
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only present for the production of these adhesives, but also necessary. For archaeological 
validity, there must be evidence of abstractions having been used during the process. As 
all we can say is that Wadley made use of these concepts during her attempt at 
reproducing the adhesive, but do not have direct evidence that they were used during the 
original attempt, the argument lacks suitable grounding as well as warranting.
3.7.3 Multi-level operations and non-routine thought 
Amati and Shallice (2007) have placed an emphasis on the concepts of multi-level 
operations and non-routine thought as being important indicators of sophisticated 
cognition. These concepts emerge from their computational model, dealing with the 
evolution of cognition, and the differences between species, and will be discussed below.
This model deals with so-called h-capacities, which are capacities specific to 
modern human cognition as compared to non-humans. These capacities include concepts 
such as language, abstract thought, Theory of Mind, anticipatory planning, organisation 
and more (ibid.). The model is loosely divided into three computational types that have 
developed over time to deal with routine operations and supervisory operations, which 
represent classifications of capacities used in the model (ibid.). Type one computations 
are the most basic, they deal with routine operations and are seen in many mammals 
(ibid.). Type two and three computations are already more limited species-wise, while 
type three computations are specific to modern humans, and allowing for novel strategy 
generation, open-ended goal setting and prospective memory (ibid.). Amati and Shallice 
(ibid.) have identified a concept specific to modern human cognition that they have 
termed “latching”, which is the driving force behind these capabilities. Latching is an 
adaptive strategy to deal with novel situations which is only found in type three 
computations. It is necessary for abstract projectuality, a distinctly human trait (ibid.). It 
is this capacity within type three computations that is responsible for fluent, non-routine 
thought, goal-directed strategy adaptation, and multi-level operations required for 
problem solving(ibid.).
Wadley has suggested that the adhesive production process, which as discussed 
above, calls for constant attention and adaptive problem solving, is an example of this 
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type of non-routine thought. She argues that during the entire process people had to have 
been mindful of changes and problems that would have required adaptations in their 
strategy. It seems very likely that the production of the adhesive did indeed require non-
routine thought and strategy adaptation, linking it directly to modern human cognitive 
sophistication. 
Brain structures have been identified that are relevant to the operations central to 
type I and type II computations, dealing with the routine operations found in most 
mammals. The model proposed by Amati and Shallice (2007) has unfortunately not found 
any scientific evidence for brain structures controlling the concept of latching, and thus 
for type three computations. Though we are certainly capable of the abilities tied to this 
concept of latching, the lack of neurological support for an overarching construct 
responsible for these capabilities means it cannot (yet) be tied directly to anatomical 
modernity or its accompanying cognitive sophistication. This is consistent with the theory 
that no qualitative change has taken place  in the human brain during the shift to so-called 
modern behaviour (Tattersall 2002). Amati and Shallice (2007) have proposed for 
instance that a basic functional architecture was possibly already in place in earlier 
humans such as Homo erectus, whereas cognitive ability did continue to evolve (ibid.).
As latching is introduced as a concept responsible for the h-capacities specific to 
modern humans, and the level of cognitive sophistication for AMH in the past is still 
under discussion, their cognitive complexity and possession of these h-capacities cannot 
simply be assumed. We therefore need to look to the archaeological evidence for clues as 
to the validity of this model.
Amati and Shallice (2007) have looked into this problem through their list of h-
capacities. Most of these, such as Theory of Mind, abstract thought, dynamic concepts, 
and others, are pretty much impossible to find within archaeological contexts. The only h-
capacities that are supported by archaeological or anthropological evidence are tool 
making, aesthetic sense, and visual representation. For tool production, the link to 
modernity is made through the appearance of mode 4 technology in Europe and Africa 
around 40 kya, bringing greater differentiation and standardization of forms, indicating 
“more clearly distinct mental objectives” (ibid., 363). The other two capacities rely on 
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evidence of markings and symbolism, arising in Africa and Europe around 75 kya. 
Though tool production makes a fair case, the other two capacities are speculative at best. 
There is often little proof of the exact meaning of symbols or signs that appear in the 
record. The importance of symbolism has also been pulled into discussion recently, as 
mentioned earlier. Wadley's (2010) argument would therefore be much stronger if there 
were more archaeological evidence available that could tie Amati and Shallice's (2007) 
construct of latching to the archaeological record directly.
Though it seems fairly clear that the adhesive production process did call on non-
routine thought and strategy adaptation, the underlying framework of these concepts does 
not provide very strong evidence that this was a trait specific to anatomically modern 
humans. Once again going back to Botha's (2008) critique it is therefore not only not 
suitably grounded in archaeological evidence, but the lack of neurological support also 
makes it unwarranted. By Wynn and Coolidge's (2009) strict standard it is therefore 
lacking in both archaeological and cognitive validity.
3.7.4 Mental rotation
Mental rotation involves the ability to mentally rotate representations of two- or three-
dimensional objects. It is often used in psychological tests to determine the cognitive 
development of infants, or the capacities of subjects with brain-lesions. Performance on 
spatial tasks such as complex span tasks, involving mental rotation of for instance blocks 
or letters, is linked to higher order cognitive capabilities such as executive function and 
complex reasoning (Kane 2004). Wadley (2010) has argued that the capacity for mental 
rotation is shown through the different placements of points and segments hafted onto the 
spears at Sibudu Cave. She suggests that people had to have been able to think abstractly 
about the placement of these inserts in order to determine their later functions as tools. It 
does seem rather strange if the different placements were all due to coincidences or 
random action, more likely people did indeed purposefully place the inserts a certain way, 
with a certain function in mind. Besides being obviously difficult to prove however, 
mental rotation is also not necessarily an ability reserved specifically for anatomically 
modern humans. Going back to Barnard's (2010) subsystem model of mental architecture, 
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great apes have been shown to have a six-subsystem mental architecture that shows 
enough of a grasp of spatial-praxis organization that it consequently shows enhanced 
working memory (ibid.). 
Research on chimpanzees has even shown them to have enhanced working 
memory for visually presented numerical stimuli that is even better than that of humans 
(Inoue and Matsuzawa 2007). Barnard is of the opinion that this spatial-praxis capability 
and sophisticated pattern recognition would support mental rotation and other complex 
spatial-praxis behaviours in great apes. Needless to say, if should this be the case, it 
follows that the capabilities were present not just for AMH, but for other hominin species 
as well. Further research would of course be required to settle this matter.
As the archaeological evidence supports the conclusion that the Sibudu 
inhabitants were capable of mental rotation, the argument seems to be grounded, showing 
archaeological validity. The lack of consensus as to whether mental rotation can be 
considered a strictly modern human trait means the argument cannot yet be named 
cognitively valid or completely warranted. This would require further investigation, 
perhaps into the extent of mental rotation capabilities of humans and primates.
3.7.5 Embedded recursion    
Recursion is the repeating of items in a similar way. Embedding is the process of 
containing some form of structure within another structure, thereby a form of recursion in 
itself. This can be understood most clearly through the example of language, where 
sentences can be combined and slightly restructured, yet keep their inherent meaning. 
Recursion has been central to many theories of language, most prominently those of 
Noam Chomsky (1960). Because of its repetitive nature, it is inherently linked to working 
memory development, from where it needs to be recalled in order to be repeated. With 
this concept, language could potentially have infinite combinability, as long as the initial 
product is held in mind. Though the importance of recursion in language has been 
challenged by Everett (2005), who claims that not all people use a language in which 
recursion plays an essential role, it has recently been shown through neurolinguistic 
studies to be supported by neurobiological brain structures that deal specifically with 
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recursive language, which are present in all humans (Kaan et al. 2002). As discussed in 
the previous chapter, the link has been made from language to tool use, arguing that the 
manipulation of objects can show structural and cognitive parallels to language, including 
recursion and concepts such as past and future (Haidle 2010). It has been suggested that 
the creation of adhesives also employs these linguistic tools (Reuland 2010) through the 
need for constant attention, feedback, assessment and readjustment in order to produce a 
working product. The combinability also has the potential to be infinite, if the maker can 
keep in mind what has been done and what still needs to be done, and can adapt to 
changing circumstances.
Though neurological support is at hand for the construct of recursive language 
being present in all humans, there is of yet no supporting evidence that a technical 
recursive element in tool use or any other technical capacity is also specific to cognitive 
sophistication, or that it is directly connected with recursive language. While Wadley 
(2010) argues that cognitive sophistication is shown through a technical recursive 
element in the adhesive production process, there is no evidence that recursive language 
was used. While the production process does indicate recursive tactics to have been 
employed, giving the technical element of recursion archaeological validity, this technical 
recursive element unfortunately does not have any support from cognitive science, 
causing it to be unwarranted. While recursive language does have cognitive support, it 
has neither been shown to be present during the adhesive production process, nor 
necessary, leaving it ungrounded as well as unwarranted.
3.7.6 Cognitive fluidity 
Cognitive fluidity (Mithen 1996), as discussed in the previous chapter, refers to the 
interaction of different types of intelligence, which where previously separated in the 
closed-off domains of a modular mind. The ability of these different domains to interact 
with one another, is suggested to be specific to the modern human mind, indicating 
cognitive sophistication.
It is Wadleys (2010) argument that cognitive fluidity can be seen in the Sibudu 
Cave adhesive production process. Mithen (1996) describes how a mind with phase two 
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intelligence would not be capable of combining social and technical intelligence, and 
would therefore leave no traces of for instance tool production in areas of social 
gathering. The need to be able to do and think several things at ones, such as mixing 
multiple ingredients, adjusting to changes, tending the fire, talking, mentally rotating 
segments and so on, according to Wadley (2010) shows cognitive fluidity. It does seem 
that there would have to have been some interplay between different forms of intelligence 
for the creation of this adhesive. While this is not  necessarily a social component, 
technical and natural history intelligence, as well as possibly language, would have to 
have interacted with one another. The knowledge of raw materials, where to find them, 
what uses they have and how these can be accomplished, necessary for the adhesive 
production, fall under natural history intelligence. The knowledge of how to deal with 
technical elements such as building a fire, combining the materials and drying the 
adhesive properly, fall under technical intelligence. The full production process would 
therefore require a combination of these different elements.
As discussed however, Mithen's (1996) theory of cognitive fluidity has received 
much criticism from cognitive science, making it unwarranted. Archaeological evidence 
discussed earlier, in the form of the Schöningen spears (Thieme 1999, 2005) has also 
shown this theory not to be properly grounded.
3.8 Apprenticeship and learning
Though several of the above cognitive prerequisites proposed by Wadley  (2010) seem to 
have been involved in the production of the Sibudu adhesives, none of them haven 
proven to be able to live up to Wynn and Coolidge's (2009) strict standard completely, 
failing to provide either cognitive or archaeological validity. The same can be said of 
Botha's (2008) schematic argument. The bridging arguments linking the procedures and 
knowledge involved in the production sequence at Sibudu Cave lack either proper 
grounding or proper warranting for the cognitive inferences made from them. 
An alternative to these cognitive models for the adhesive production process at 
Sibudu Cave can be found in Wynn and Coolidge's (2009) theory of apprenticeship and 
learning. Taking equifinality into account, when there are different ways of reaching a 
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destination, or in this case a final product, Occams razor states that it is probably the 
simplest one that is responsible. With the models of cognition used by Wadley all implied 
to be connected to advanced cognitive sophistication and executive functions, the 
apprenticeship and learning model would qualify as the simpler route. This method 
differs from more innovative ones requiring executive function control (Wynn and 
Coolidge 2007b). Seeing as expertise has been shown to be capable of producing a hafted 
spear (Wynn and Coolidge 2007b, it would quite possibly also be capable of producing 
an adhesive like the ones produced at Sibudu Cave. This possibility will be discussed in 
more detail below.
The evidence discussed in the previous chapter, of apprenticeship and learning 
being used as a technique by bonobos and chimpanzees, as well as by people alive today, 
implies that our common ancestor could also have employed this technique for technical 
learning and manufacture, and by extension, so could the people of Sibudu Cave.
I would argue that the work of the Langda adze makers, through the obtaining and 
identifying of separate raw materials, as well as the production of extensively worked 
core forms, is comparable to the combining of raw materials in the production process of 
the adhesives created at Sibudu Cave. Combined with the ability of expertise through 
apprenticeship to be able to not only master the basic skills but also be able to adapt to 
changing circumstances in the production process (Wynn and Coolidge 2007b), I would 
argue that expertise may well have been able to account for the production of compound 
adhesives at Sibudu Cave. The skills now attributed to cognitive sophistication might 
well be explained by an accumulation of knowledge, stored in procedural memories, as 
proposed by Wynn and Coolidge (2007b), similar to the “stock of knowledge” (Kellar 
and Kellar 1996) concept. Years of apprenticeship could have allowed for the storage of 
procedures for a range of adaptations to problems and interference that might occur 
during the production process, allowing people to draw from these stored responses when 
necessary, similar to the “umbrella plan”(ibid.) concept.
The evidence from the Stout's work as well as Wynn and Coolidge's (2009) 
analysis of Levallois reduction would imply that this theory is archaeologically valid. The 
archaeological validity of this theory for adhesive making cannot be directly proven 
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however, as we cannot provide irrefutable proof that this was the technique employed for 
the creation of the Sibudu Cave adhesives. The evidence from modern day ethnographic 
research as well as research into the behaviour of chimpanzees and bonobos however, 
indicates that the theory does have cognitive validity. 
3.9 A guideline for cognitive inferences
In order to get a better idea of exactly which procedures and knowledge are required to 
make grounded and warranted, archaeologically and cognitively valid arguments as to the 
cognitive inferences made by Wadley, I have compiled a list of necessary requirements 
for each of the cognitive constructs implied by Wadley, as shown in table 1 below. 
Archaeological validity is shown through the requirement of there being proof of a 
certain capability being present. Cognitive validity on the other hand requires two 
separate lines of evidence, namely proof that the capability was necessary for adhesive 
production, and support from cognitive science, which is outlined in the table.
This list will be used as a guideline in the coming chapter in order to examine the 
validity of inferences made on cognition in the Neandertal context. Table 2 describes the 
actual steps taken in the adhesive production process that correspond with each of the 
discussed constructs.
Table 1 Guideline for the requirements necessary for cognitive inferences with archaeological 
and cognitive validity.
Mental constructs       Requirements for evidence of cognitive sophistication
Archaeological validity/ 
groundedness
Cognitive validity/ warrantedness
Enhanced Working 
Memory
• Evidence that the Sibudu 
cave adhesive makers had 
enhanced working memory 
e.g. superior attention, 
language acquisition, 
intelligence, memory.
• Proof of the necessity of enhanced 
working memory to create the 
adhesives
• Cognitive/Neurological evidence 
of enhanced working memory 
being linked to cognitive 
sophistication.
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Fourth-order  
Abstractions
• Evidence of  abstractions 
having been used in 
production sequence 
• Proof of the necessity of abstract 
concepts to create the adhesives
 -eg reproduction with/without 
abstract guidance
• Cognitive/Neurological evidence 
of fourth-order abstractions being 
linked to cognitive sophistication.
Multi-level 
operations and non-
routine thought
• Evidence of changing 
circumstances that require 
adaptation of procedures, 
switching of attention and 
anticipation of problems
• Proof of the necessity that 
successful production is not 
possible without the ability to 
adapt, switch attention, and 
anticipate problems
• Cognitive/Neurological evidence 
for “latching” or h-capacities 
linked to cognitive sophistication.
Embedded 
Recursion
• Evidence of use of language 
for production sequence 
OR
• Evidence that technological 
recursion occurred during 
production sequence
-eg attention, feedback, 
adjustment, concepts of past 
and future
• Evidence of necessity of language 
use during adhesive production 
-eg through reproduction with 
without verbal guidance
• Evidence of recursion in language 
being specific t cognitive 
sophistication.
OR
• Evidence of necessity of technical 
recursion elements for adhesive 
production
• Evidence linking recursion in 
technical capabilities to cognitive 
sophistication.
Mental 
Rotation
• Evidence of mental rotation 
of items 
-eg through differing 
placements of items
• Evidence of necessity of mental 
rotation for adhesive production
• Evidence that mental rotation is 
linked specifically to cognitive 
sophistication.
Cognitive Fluidity • Evidence of combining of 
different forms of 
intelligence
-eg social and technical 
intelligence
• Evidence of necessity of 
combining different forms of 
intelligence for adhesive 
production 
• Cognitive/neurological evidence 
for theory of domain specific 
intelligences and cognitive fluidity 
for  cognitive sophistication
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Expertise through 
apprenticeship and 
learning
• Evidence of 
expertise/apprenticeship 
being present/responsible 
for the adhesive production 
process 
-eg stock of knowledge, 
umbrella plan, constellation 
present
• Evidence of the necessity of 
expertise/apprenticeship for the 
production of the adhesive
• Cognitive/Neurological evidence 
for the theory of expertise through 
apprenticeship and learning.
Table 2 Knowledge and Procedures shown in AMH adhesive production process that correspong 
to cognitive inferences.
Cognitive construct Steps of adhesive production process shown, corresponding to 
requirements of archaeological and cognitive validity
Enhanced Working 
Memory
• No elements identified.
Fourth-order 
abstractions
• Knowledge of required consistency of adhesive, knowledge of 
order of steps in the production procedure.
Multi-level 
operations and non-
routine thought
• Keeping attention on drying adhesive to ensure working end-
product
• Rotating adhesive over fire or moving it further from the fire when 
it threatens to overheat
Embedded Recursion • Adding of certain ingredients, adjusting quantities, rotating the 
adhesive periodically over the fire
Mental Rotation • Rotating the segments in one mind to envisage the different 
possible placements for tools
Cognitive Fluidity • Knowledge of e.g. raw materials and fire making/tool making
Expertise through 
Apprenticeship and 
Learning
• Range of knowledge of raw materials, fire making, and composite 
tool production show stock of knowledge - adhesive mixing, fire 
building, adhesive application shows umbrella plan – 
toolsemployed: adhesive, grinding stone, fire, etc. show 
constellation 
3.10 Chapter conclusions
The cognitive concepts inferred by Wadley (2010) seem to be based on fairly strong 
evidence from the production process described for Sibudu Cave. It seems that the people 
making these adhesives very likely possessed a cognitive sophistication capable of 
problem solving, mental flexibility, and adaptation to changing circumstances. However, 
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the problems with many of the implications lie with the models themselves. Amati and 
Shallice's (2007) theory, though convincing evidence was given by Wadley (2010) for 
non-routine thought, was shown to lack any neurological basis for their type three 
computations, as does Mithen's (1996) theory for cognitive fluidity, and Wynn and 
Coolidge's (2009) theory of enhanced working memory. This is not surprising 
considering the limited amount of data available in the archaeological record to support 
theories of cognitive evolution. Mental rotation was likely present, but was shown not 
necessarily to be specific for only anatomically modern humans. Barnard's (2010) meta-
representation theory, though well-founded, has not yet proven the use of abstractions to 
be necessary for adhesive production. Recursion appears to be well founded 
scientifically, but as a language construct, not a technical ability. An alternative 
explanation may also be sufficient to account for these aspects of adhesive production, 
namely the method of expertise and learning proposed by Wynn and Coolidge (2007b). 
Whether the inferences made in this chapter are also applicable to the Neandertal 
context will be shown in the next chapter, where comparisons will be made with the 
knowledge and procedures involved in the Neandertal adhesive production process. 
Archaeological and cognitive validity will be investigated, and the alternative theory of 
apprenticeship and learning will again be considered as an explanation of the adhesive 
production.
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Chapter 4. Neandertal adhesive making in palaeolithic Europe
4.1 Introduction
Having studied all the different archaeological and cognitive aspects of AMH adhesive 
production at Sibudu Cave, it is now time to look more closely at these same aspects for 
Neandertal adhesive production. This will be done by examining evidence of hafting and 
adhesive production from the two German sites of Königsaue and Inden-Altdorf. The 
evidence for hafting and adhesive production will be described and analysed, and 
checked for archaeological and cognitive validity. The key knowledge and procedures 
involved in the production will be outlined, and the cognitive inferences implied for 
AMH adhesive production will be considered as possibilities for explaining these key 
aspects of knowledge and procedures. The theory of expertise through apprenticeship and 
learning will be considered as an alternative explanation. These cognitive models will be 
tested for groundedness and warantedness. 
4.2 Background and Research context
During the Middle Palaeolithic, great changes occurred throughout Europe. For the large 
part dominated by Neandertals, the later Middle Palaeolithic and early to middle Upper 
Palaeolithic saw not only the advent of anatomically modern humans spreading 
throughout Europe, but also a range of technological, climatic, behavioural, and possibly 
even cognitive changes. Changes were seen in tool types (Bar-Josef 2002), raw materials 
were gathered from further distances through long-distance exchange networks 
(McBrearty and Brooks 2000; Bar-Josef 2003), new materials such as bone and antler 
were exploited more (Bar-Yosef 2003) and expressions of symbolic or artistic behaviour 
were starting to be seen throughout Europe (Conard 2009; Zilhao 2010). For Europe 
these changes occurred during the early to middle Upper Palaeolithic, whereas the period 
under discussion for the coming section deals with the earlier Middle Palaeolithic period, 
before the presence of AMH. 
During that period, from around 200 ka to 30 ka (Wynn and Coolidge 2011), 
Neandertals dominated throughout Europe. As discussed in the previous chapters, though 
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often thought to have been less advanced than AMH, they have been shown to have 
employed a range of behaviours similar to that of AMH, including range expansion, 
planning behaviour, similar resource exploitation, adaptation to numerous and diverse 
ecosystems, symbolic behaviour, and probably language (Deacon 1997; McBrearty and 
Brooks 2000; Adler et al. 2006; Tattersall 2009). 
One of the behaviours seen in both the AMH and Neandertal context is that of 
adhesive production. For AMH, adhesive making has been very clearly linked to certain 
cognitive capabilities. This is an excellent behaviour to use as a comparison for cognitive 
capabilities as there are several occurrences known from the European record of 
Neandertals creating adhesives, with which to compare them. Occurrences from two of 
these sites will be used for further analysis, namely the site of Königsaue, Germany, and 
that of Inden-Altdorf, also in Germany. The adhesives used at these two sites were both 
made from birch bark tar (Koller et al. 2001; Pawlik and Thissen 2011). Chemical 
investigations, usually through gas chromatography/mass spectrometry, have confirmed 
the widespread use of birch bark tar for adhesive production, sealants and waterproofing 
agents in prehistoric European context (Aveling and Heron 1999; Pollard and Heron 
1999; Regert et al. 2006). Especially from the Neolithic period onwards, the use of birch 
bark tar seems to have become more and more common (Binder et al. 1991; Charters et  
al. 1993; Regert et al. 1996; Regert et al. 1998). Use of birch bark tar in earlier 
palaeolithic times has also been discovered at several sites (Koller et al. 2001; Grünberg 
2002; Mazza et al. 2006; Modugno et al. 2006; Pawlik et al. 2011). Several attempts have 
been made to reproduce these adhesives in ways that would have been possible in 
Palaeolithic times, with corresponding technology and materials (Todtenhaupt et al. 
2007; Todtenhaupt and Kurzweil 2007; Pomstra and Meijer 2010)
Examples of the adhesives found at Königsaue and Inden-Altdorf will be 
analysed, their production processes will be studied and compared to that of Sibudu 
Cave, and their cognitive implications will be looked at. The information concerning 
these sites will come mainly from the publications of Koller and colleagues (2001) for 
Königsaue, and Pawlik and Thissen (2011) for Inden-Altdorf. As these two sites share a 
similar research background as well as a similar adhesive type, the evidence for the 
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production of the adhesives will be discussed for the two sites together. This production 
sequence will then be analysed to see whether any cognitive inferences on the makers of 
the adhesives might be made through it. Any inferences made will of course be guided by 
Botha's (2008) structured line of argument, Wynn and Coolidge's (2009) strict standard, 
and the guidelines for the requirements for evidence of modern cognitive sophistication 
set up in the previous chapter.
4.3 Königsaue, Germany
The first site that will be looked into is that of Königsaue, Germany. Situated at the shore 
of lake Asherleben, it lies in the province of Saxony-Anhalt, Eastern Germany (fig 8). It 
was first discovered by Dietrich Mania in 1963, after the lake had been drained, and 
mining into the lignite bed found near and underneath the lake had begun. The mining 
exposed several layers with Middle palaeolithic remains, including a great deal of flint 
objects. These vary from prepared cores to bifacial tools. Animal bones indicate 
mammoth, woolly rhino, red deer, horses and reindeer may have been hunted at the site. 
Among these finds were also two pieces of pitch, seen in figure 9. These pieces clearly 
show the marking of being man-made. Their shape, as well as indentations of a knife 
blade and wood-cell structures, and a partial fingerprint on one of the pieces are 
consistent with hafting. Analysis of the two pieces showed them to have characteristics 
specific to birch tar. The dating of the site has been determined through the stratigraphy 
of the Ascherleben lake deposits. These deposits give a very accurate climatic record up 
to 125.000 BP (Koller et al. 2001). The deposition sequence of the lake has been divided 
into fifteen sedimentation cycles with corresponding climatic zones. Within the third 
sedimentation cycle were three horizons that produced the Middle palaeolithic finds, 
labeled horizons A, B, and C, as shown in figure 10. 
This sedimentation cycle was formed during the second interstadial of the 
Weichselian (Koller et al. 2001). These horizons have been Geo-stratigraphically dated to 
over 80.000 BP, corresponding to Oxygen Isotope Stage 5a (ibid.). The pitch pieces in 
these horizons have also been separately dated for further accuracy. AMS radiocarbon 
dating produced ages of 43.800 +- 2100 BP for the sample from the older horizon A and 
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48.400 +- 3700 BP for the one from the younger horizon B (Hedges et al.1998).
Figure 8 Map showing the location of Königsaue and Inden-Altdorf.
Figure 9 Pitch pieces from Königsaue A and B, respectively (Koller et al. 2001).
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Königsaue
Figure 10 Stratigraphy showing the Middle Palaeolithic horizons A, B and C of the northern bank 
of former lake Ascherleben (Koller et al. 2001).
 
This quite obviously does not correspond with the earlier mentioned geological dating. 
Due to the inaccuracy of radiocarbon measurements over 60 thousand years (Plastino et  
al. 2001), the authors argue that the dates for these pieces can be seen as a minimum 
value rather than a definite one (Koller et al. 2001). Due to their ages, these finds have 
been assigned to the Neandertal period. Accompanying finds such as the flint tools 
suggest that the horizons may belong to separate cultures however. The abundance of 
bifacial tools in layer A has led the authors to conclude that this layer belongs to the 
Micoquo-Prodnikian industry, possibly assigned to an early form of modern Homo 
sapiens (ibid.). This seems rather unlikely given the early date however, especially as this 
is considered a minimum value.
Layer B on the other hand shows mainly prepared cores, clearly linking it to the 
Neandertal Mousterian culture (Koller et al. 2001). The clear stratigraphy, along with a 
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detailed analysis of the pitch pieces, which will follow, make this an excellent first site to 
use as a comparison for the finds at Sibudu Cave.
4.4 Inden-Altdorf, Germany
The second site that will be used for comparison is that of Inden-Altdorf, also in 
Germany (fig 4.1). Over 3000 square meters in total, the site is situated in the Inde river 
valley in Western Germany, and borders the Pleistocene Maas river terrace. During lignite 
mining excavations in the valley in 2006, Middle Palaeolithic remains were found at the 
site. Finds include fireplaces, pits, large stones and many stone artefacts. Paleobotanical 
analysis of charcoal samples at the site have placed it in Marine Isotope stage 5e (Lang 
1994), with dates between 128 and 115 ka BP, corresponding to the Eemian interglacial 
(Pawlik and Thissen 2011). The geology and stratigraphy for the eastern slope of the 
valley can be seen in figure 11, where layers 10 and 11 correspond with the Eemian 
interglacial (ibid.). The artefact assemblage found at the site consists of several different 
elements, such as unifacial knives typical of the Micoquian, Levallois flakes and cores, 
Kostenki and Pradnik knives, and Upper Palaeolithic tools such as burins, scrapers, 
blades and blade-cores. Many artefacts in the assemblage show blackish residues (fig 12), 
which were identified as dried pitch remains, and are discussed in more detail below. 
These residues were found on projectile points as well as other types of tools. Signs of 
wear and tool use could be seen on the distal parts of these tools, but not on the part 
where the pitch covered them, consistent with hafting (Pawlik and Thissen 2011). Use-
wear analysis also indicated clear signs of hafting on many of the tools. Microscopic 
analysis showed the residues to be very similar to birch pitch residues found on tools 
from the sites of Burgaschisee-Sud, Switzerland (Pawlik 1995), Henauhof-Nord, 
Germany (Pawlik 1995,1997), and Ullafelsen, Austria (Pawlik 2004), confirming their 
nature. The similar industry, early age, and clear dating of this site, compared to the site 
of Königsaue, as well as of course the use of birch bark for the adhesive production, 
make this a good second site for analysis, which will be continued presently.
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Figure 11 Stratigraphy of the eastern slope of the Inde valley excavation, showing Eemian layers 
(Pawlik and Thissen 2011).
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Figure 12 Birch pitch residues found on artefacts from Inden-Altdorf (Pawlik et al. 2011)
4.5 Adhesive Production Process
4.5.1 Ingredients and Analyses
In order to find out the composition of the adhesives from both sites, several analyses 
were performed by the authors in question. To identify the different elements in the 
samples, the pieces from Königsaue underwent a Gas chromatography-mass spectrometry 
analysis. The results were consistent with characteristics specific to birch tar, confirmed 
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through results of earlier research (Sandermann 1965; Funke 1969; Sauter et al. 1980; 
Rottlander 1983). The sample from Königsaue B showed some plastisizers from 
contamination, but other than that both samples indicated no further ingredients than 
birch bark tar (Koller et al. 2001). The same is true for the adhesives found at Inden-
Altdorf, where micro-wear and residue analysis was performed on a sample of 136 tools.
Micro-wear analysis indicated that 15 of these artefacts were used as projectile 
points, as indicated through the pattern of micro-wear. Most other tools showed 
indications of having been used in the processing of plants, skins, hides or harder tools 
such as bone, wood and antler. A total of 17 tools were identified as having been used for 
hafting and retooling purposes. Residue analysis showed residues on 83 artefacts. These 
residues then underwent closer inspection under a scanning electron microscope. The 
results of some of these can be seen in figure 12. The stereo microscopic analysis showed 
a dark black-brown viscous liquid with micro-hairline cracks in the surface (fig. 12a-d). 
Figure 12g supports the liquid state of the pitch at application, which had filled a hairline 
crack in the surface of the flint tool. The microscopic analysis indicated the presence of 
some plant tissue and fibers to be present in the some of the pitch samples, but these were 
shown to be derived from the birch bark itself, the sample not having been fully formed 
into pitch. Analysis showed a total of 39 tools to have been hafted and still carrying pitch 
residue. These included not only blades, but also flakes, pointed flakes, scrapers, 
retouched flakes, a unifacial point, and a combination tool point/burin. They were not 
only used as projectile points, but also for scraping, as knives, and several had multiple 
functions (Pawlik and Thissen 2011). A sandstone pebble was furthermore found to be 
completely covered with pitch residue. This item is thought to have acted as either a 
collection basin for the pitch during production, or as an item on which to keep the pitch 
during application, options which will be discussed further in the production process.
Further investigation through energy dispersal analysis of X-rays (EDX) was 
performed to investigate the elementary composition of the residues. Besides high 
amounts of carbon showing the organic nature of the pitch, peaks were also found for 
Potassium, Calcium, and Sulfur, as well as several other elements originating from the 
sediment itself. Comparisons with birch bark pitch from the Neolithic and Mesolithic 
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sites mentioned above showed the same high peaks for these three elements, whereas 
these peaks were not found for analysis of pitch produced in air-tight metal containers 
often used in post-Neolithic pitch production (Pawlik 1995; Kurzweil and Todtenhaupt 
1990). These results were found to be consistent with exposure to fire and ash during the 
production process, in line with results from other Mesolithic sites (Walker 2000, Dinnis 
et al. 2009).
            Looking at Botha's diagram, this places us back at bridging argument B, 
connecting the artefact or feature of A; in this case stone tools and pitch residues; to the 
technical system C; hafting and adhesive making. An overview of this argument is given 
in figure 13 below. As extensive and archaeologically valid methods of analysis were 
used to conclude signs of hafting and adhesive production, this argument is grounded as 
well as warranted, the evidence definitely being relevant to the implication of hafting and 
adhesive making.
            
            Artefact or feature:                                                   Technical system
               stone tools and                                                       hafting and adhesive
                pitch residue                                                                production
Figure 13  Inferential step from artefact or feature to technical system, based on Wynn's (2009) 
adapted form of Botha's (2008) schematic argument.
4.5.2 Production  process
Birch bark tar is created through a process known as dry distillation (Koller et al. 2001; 
Pomstra and Meijer 2010, Pawlik and Thissen 2011). This involves the heating of birch 
bark in an oxygen-free environment, creating a final product of birch bark tar which has 
been irreversibly transformed. The exact process by which this was done in the 
Palaeolithic times is not known for certain however. Besides the obvious tasks of 
gathering birch bark, wood, and making a fire, there are a few elements that are agreed 
upon by all to be critical to the successful production of birch bark tar. They are the 
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absence of oxygen, or at least an oxygen low environment, and a controlled temperature 
of between 340 and 420 degrees Celcius (Koller et al. 2001; Pomstra and Meijer 2010; 
Pawlik and Thissen 2011). If these elements are not taken into account, one of three 
things may happen. Too low a temperature will leave the bark unchanged and produce no 
tar, too high a temperature will char the bark and turn it hard and brittle, and too much 
oxygen will burn the bark (Koller et al. 2001; Pomstra and Meijer 2010; Pawlik and 
Thissen 2011). 
            Though several attempts have been made to recreate this process, not all have 
been equally successful. Especially when  reproducing circumstances that would have 
been possible in Palaeolithic times, the production process is quite difficult. Methods are 
known from the 10th Century AD onwards where pitch is produced with the help of air-
tight containers known as retorts (Czarnowski 1990; Kurzweil and Todtenhaupt 1990), 
where the containers are filled with birch bark rolls and placed in a charcoal fire. The lack 
of oxygen in the containers allows the birch bark to transform into tar (Pawlik and 
Thissen 2011). As ceramic or metal containers were not available in palaeolithic times 
however, a different method of production had to have been employed in these times. The 
presence of Potassium, Sulfur and Calcium in the analysis of the Inden-Altdorf pitch 
residues, indicating the exposure to fire and ash during the production, have led Pawlik 
and Thissen (2011) to propose that the pitch at the site may have been made through the 
the use of a narrow pit in the ground, functioning as the retort. They suggest that rolls of 
birch pitch may have been lighted at one end, and placed burning side down into the pit 
in the ground. The burning bark will cut off any oxygen from coming inside the pit, 
allowing the pitch to liquify. A stone placed at the bottom of the pit, such as the one found 
at the site, could have functioned to collect the pitch dripping down from the bark. This 
approach would be consistent with the findings at the sites of Inden-Altdorf and 
Königsaue. This approach is supported by evidence from the Mesolithic site of 
Henauhof-Nord, thought to be a hafting and re-tooling site for the repair of weapons and 
stone tools (Pawlik 1997), where an artefact made of birch bark wrapped around a core of 
pebbles and clay was found, presumably for the production of pitch (Kind 1997).
            In an attempt to recreate the circumstances that produced the Königsaue pitch 
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pieces, the Arbeitsgruppe Teerschweele of the Museumdorf Duppel performed several 
such experiments. These experiments consisted of heating rolls of birch bark covered in 
loam in a fire, heating them by placing them on pre-heated stone set in a hole in the 
ground, and distilling them underneath a fireplace (Todtenhaupt et al. 2007). 
Unfortunately, none of these attempts produced satisfying results. 
            Two methods that have been successful however were performed by Pomstra and 
Meijer in 2010. The description of these methods is adapted from their 2010 experimental 
report of the Steentijddag. The first method involved placing a flat piece of quartzite 
(15x18x4 cm) into a hole dug in the ground. On top of this flat stone a layer of birch bark 
approximately 3 cm thick was laid, and covered with a layer of sand, also approximately 
3 cm thick. By flattening the surface from the outside, excess oxygen was prevented from 
reaching the layer of birchbark underneath. On top of these layers a fire was built and 
kept going for around an hour. A pyrometer was used to check the temperature of the fire, 
something that obviously was not available in prehistoric times, making the task that 
much more difficult in the past. After an hour a temperature of 380 degrees had been 
reached, and after another 15 minutes the decision was made to put the fire out and check 
the progress underneath. After a cooling off period of another 15 minutes the sand was 
removed, and a substantial amount of tar was found to have dripped onto the surface of 
the quartzite stone, enough to provide tar for the hafting of several tools. Because a large 
quantity of the bark had not been turned to pitch however, it was suspected that the fire 
could have been kept going for a while longer. The process may also have benefited from 
thinner strips of birch bark placed at cross angles to each other, to allow for better heat 
circulation over all the birch bark pieces, and thereby more room for adequate distillation 
of the tar. This method would be consistent with the findings of fire indications as well as 
the small flat stone covered in pitch found at Inden-Altdorf (Pawlik and Thissen 2011).
            A second method was performed to see if tar could also be produced by means of 
a normal campfire, without having to go to the trouble of burying the birch tar, thereby 
hopefully reducing the time needed to produce the tar. Grooves were dug into the earth 
next to the campfire, into which rolls of birch bark 10-12 cm high and 5 to 7,5 cm thick 
were placed horizontally. The rolls were bound together with plant roots, covered with 
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hot coals and woodash, and left to smoulder  for 10 to 25 minutes. This method produced 
small quantities of tar, which were stuck to the inside of the rolls and often mixed with 
sand and ash. Large parts of the birch bark also remained intact. In order to improve on 
this method the rolls of bark were rolled around sticks and placed in the ground vertically 
on top of a large piece of bark that was placed underneath to collect any tar dripping 
down. Though several attempts still showed the tar to collect within the rolls of birch 
bark instead of dripping onto the larger piece underneath, a significantly larger amount of 
tar formed through this method, with less contamination with sand and ash. This second 
method would also fit well with the findings at Inden-Altdorf (Pawlik and Thissen 2011).
            Several attempts were made to improve upon these two methods, as some 
attempts using these methods still failed to produce a useful amount of tar. Failures were 
caused mainly by the temperature of the fire, the effect of wind, the length of time the 
birch bark was left to smoulder, and the depth and expertise with which it was buried. 
Especially without the help of a pyrometer as used in the first experiment, the 
temperature of the fire was very difficult to gauge, and required multiple attempts across 
many days to achieve correctly. During these attempts many of the pieces of bark either 
charred and were left unusable, or did not turn to tar at all. Wind was another highly 
influential factor in the process. A strong wind caused the temperature of the fire to drop 
out of range during several attempts, not allowing for any tar production. A windbreak 
was built in an attempt to keep the wind from influencing the temperature of the fire too 
much, which seemed to work well, yet on several occasions actually caused the 
temperature to rise so quickly as to exceed 400 degrees and char the birch bark 
underneath. The oxygen supply to the birch bark must be cut off to prevent the bark from 
burning and creating a useless end product. The depth at which the bark was buried (deep 
vs shallow), along with the way in which it was buried (vertically vs horizontally, thick 
strips vs thin strips), and the duration that it remained buried, all impacted the amount of 
tar that was produced and the quality of the final product. 
            In order to produce tar that is of a quality that can be worked with, and of a 
quantity that is worth the effort put into the production, complete attention is needed 
throughout the production process. The temperature of the fire must be minded 
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constantly, the wind must be taken into account, the birch bark must be buried properly 
and taken out at the right time, and the oxygen supply must be properly cut off. If any of 
these elements is not done correctly, the tar will not form properly. 
            The authors suggest that it might have been possible that different methods were 
employed for different purposes. The second method achieved its goal faster, but also 
produced less tar, and therefore may have been used when only a little tar was needed, 
perhaps for the production or repair of only a few tools. The first method took longer, but 
also produced a significantly larger amount of tar, perhaps employed when large amounts 
of tar were needed, such as the production of several weapons and /or tools. Both 
methods fit well with the indications of fire and ash found at Inden-Altdorf, as well as the 
flat stone that was found covered in pitch residue. The experiments using these two 
methods have both shown that  it was definitely possible for people to create a birch bark 
tar even under Palaeolithic circumstances.
4.6 Key Procedures and Knowledge
In order to analyse the production sequence properly and be able to make any inferences 
on cognition, it is important to underline the key procedures and knowledge involved in 
the production sequence. This places us at bridging argument D in Botha's (2008) 
argument, linking the technical system to the knowledge and procedures, which can be 
seen in figure 14 below. 
                                                                                      Procedures and knowledge  e.g.
                  Technical system                                        -knowledge of surroundings and        
           hafting and adhesive making                               material qualities
                                                                                      -procedure of fire building and control 
                                                                                      -problem solving, anticipation, abstract
                                                                                       concepts
Figure 14 Inferential step from technical system to procedure and knowledge, based on Wynn's 
(2009) adapted form of Botha's (2008) schematic argument.
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The key elements of knowledge employed in the Neandertal adhesive production are as 
follows: 1. knowledge of the natural surrounding in order to find the birch bark, 2. 
knowledge of the qualities of birch bark in order to know how to use it in adhesive 
production, 3. knowledge of the technical procedures of fire making and temperature 
control, 4. knowledge of abstract concepts such as workability, dry, wet, liquid, solid, 
past, future. 5. Knowledge of the techniques of keeping and switching attention, 
anticipation, adapting to changing circumstances, and problem solving, 6. knowledge of 
the most beneficial duration of the distillation process. The key procedures involved in 
the adhesive production process include the following: 1. gathering the raw material, 2. 
burying the birch bark at the correct depth and angle,thereby cutting off the flow of 
oxygen to the birch bark, 3. building and controlling a fire at a temperature of between 
380 and 420 degrees Celcius, 4. removing the birch bark and collecting the liquified tar 
for hafting. An overview of the steps taken in the production process can be seen in the 
flow chart below (fig 15).
   
   gathering                    burying birch                 building and                   removing birch
   birch bark                      bark in                         maintaining                       bark and
                                       earth/ashes                    fire at correct                    collecting
                                                                              temperature                        the tar
Figure 15. Flow chart of the Neandertal adhesive production squence.
4.7 Cognitive Prerequisites
Different methods are shown to have been capable of producing birch bark tar under 
palaeolithic conditions. A few elements have been shown to be crucial to the outcome of 
a useful end product. The temperature of the fire and the cutting off of oxygen are the 
main elements, but the duration of the fire, the depth at which the birch bark is buried, the 
manner in which it is buried, and the strength of the wind all play an important role in the 
outcome as well. Though the Neandertals adhesives described above are clearly an 
example of a simpler form of adhesive making that what we have seen from the Sibudu 
Cave context, this does not necessarily imply that simpler cognitive strategies were 
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employed. As Haidle (2010) describes, only part of a people's cognitive capacities are 
visible in their material culture, and what is visible does not necessarily reflect their 
maximum cognitive capacity. Equally sophisticated cognitive abilities may have been 
employed, which is what will be analysed during the coming section. 
The knowledge and procedures outlined above were crucial to the positive 
outcome of the adhesive production process, giving the inference cognitive validity. The 
archaeological validity of this inference, linking the technical system of hafting, to the 
procedures and knowledge listed above, is shown through the attempts at reproducing the 
adhesives discussed in the previous section. It seems that cognitive capabilities such as 
problem anticipation, ideas about future actions, and prepared responses and adjustments 
were equally necessary in the present context as in that of Sibudu Cave. Whether the 
capabilities listed above imply advanced cognitive sophistication or whether they were 
perhaps enabled through apprenticeship and learning, as suggested by Wynn and 
Coolidge (2007b) to be the main problem solving strategy of Neandertals, is discussed 
below. This places us at the final bridging argument of Botha's schematic argument, 
linking the procedures and knowledges involved in the production process to possible 
cognitive prerequisites, as shown in figure 16 below. The precise elements involved in the 
adhesive production process that correspond to each of the cognitive concepts under 
discussion is outlined in table 3 at the end of the cognitive prerequisite section.
    Procedures and Knowledge   e.g.:                              Cognitive Prerequisites
    -knowledge of surroundings and                                       -Enhanced working memory
      material qualities                                                             -Fourth-order abstraction
     -procedure of fire building and control                            -Multi-level operations and
     -problem solving, anticipation, abstract                             non-routine thought
      concepts                                                                           -Mental rotation
                                                                                               -Embedded recursion
                                                                                               -Cognitive fluidity
Figure 16 Inferential step from technical system to procedure and knowledge, based on Wynn's 
(2009) adapted form of Botha's (2008) schematic argument.
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4.7.1 Enhanced Working Memory
For the theory of enhanced working memory to be a valid inference for Neandertal 
adhesive making, it needs to be shown that the makers of these adhesives used an 
enhanced form of working memory through construct such as attention, intelligence, 
language acquisition, learning or memory (Wynn and Coolidge 2009, 216). As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, this would require a temporal comparison, and therefore cannot 
be proven at this point. Enhanced memory being necessary for the adhesive making can 
also not be proven, and as has been discussed, the model itself lacks cognitive support, 
making the inference unwarranted. Haidle's (2010) approach of problem-solution 
distance can be analysed through the flow chart of Neandertal adhesive production as 
seen in figure 14 above. By itself this does not provide much information, yet a 
comparison between the AMH and Neandertal production sequences can be made, which 
will be done in the concluding section of this thesis.
4.7.2 Fourth-order abstraction
Implementing the guidelines set up in the previous chapter, in order for the implication 
that the makers of the adhesives at Königsaue and Inden-Altdorf were capable of fourth-
order abstraction to have archaeological validity, evidence needs to be given that abstract 
concepts were used during the production sequence. This has not been proven to be the 
case. A case can be made that the makers did have knowledge of abstract concepts such 
as past, future, workability and temperature, in order to be able to adequately evaluate the 
placement of the birch bark, adjust air flow and temperature and anticipate problems of 
wind and other influencing factors. In order for archaeological validity to be satisfied 
however, proof must be given that the production of the adhesives involved knowledge of 
these concepts. Cognitive validity, with Barnard's theory itself being supported by 
cognitive science, rests on the requirement that it be shown that the adhesive production 
process was not possible without active instructions using these abstract concepts. As this 
has not been done, the criteria for archaeological validity, as well as those for cognitive 
validity for fourth-order abstraction have therefore not been satisfied.
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4.7.3 Multi-level operations and non-routine thought
The criteria for the archaeological validity of the argument that the makers of the 
adhesives at Königsaue and Inden-Altdorf were capable of multi-level operations and 
non-routine thought, are that evidence needs to be given that changing circumstances 
required the switching of attention, the capability to anticipate problems and the capacity 
to adapt adequately to these changes. The adhesive production sequence showed that the 
manner of cutting, stacking, burying and covering of the birch bark to require undivided 
attention, and to be of great consequence to the outcome of the final product. Successful 
tar production also required constant attention and evaluation of the temperature of the 
fire, and adaptation to the changing circumstances caused by wind. I would argue that 
archaeological validity for this inference is therefore intact, and groundedness to have 
been shown, were it not for the theory itself lacking archaeological support.
            Though successful adhesive production does not seem to have been possible 
without the ability to switch attention, adapt to changing circumstances, and anticipate 
problems and their required solutions, because Amati and Shallice's (2007) model has not 
found any scientific neurological basis for their computational theory, the criteria for 
cognitive validity and warantedness have not been fully met. 
4.7.4 Mental rotation
The criteria for archaeological validity of the argument that the makers of the adhesives 
at Königsaue and Inden-Altdorf were capable of mental rotation, are proof that mental 
rotation was used in the production sequence. The adhesive production sequenced 
showed that it took several attempts and many adjustments and counts of repositioning of 
elements within the production sequence to successfully create an adhesive (e.g. 
horizontal vs vertical placement of the birch bark). As this must have been true for the 
first attempts at adhesive making in Palaeolithic times as well, this would argue that the 
makers of the adhesives were capable of mental rotation. This would be in line with 
evidence for chimpanzee research indicating a spatial-praxis capability and sophisticated 
pattern recognition that would support mental rotation. This is however not a very strong 
line of evidence for mental rotation, as the placement may also have been accidental, or 
89
improved through simple trial and error, and therefore does not meet the requirements for 
archaeological validity. Though cognitive tasks involving this type of mental rotation 
have indeed been linked to higher order cognitive functions, they have not been proven to 
be necessary for the adhesive production process. Cognitive validity therefore does not 
hold up for this argument.
4.7.5 Embedded recursion
Archaeological validity for the construct of embedded recursion in adhesive production 
rests on the criteria that the makers of the adhesives at Königsaue and Inden-Altdorf 
either used recursive language during the production process, which cannot be shown, or 
that they used technical recursive elements like the ones argued by Wadley for Sibudu 
Cave (i.e. attention, feedback, adjustment, concepts of past and future). The production 
process performed by Pomstra and Meijer shows attention, feedback and adjustments to 
have been highly necessary to keep the fire at the appropriate temperature, and 
knowledge of the concepts of past and future to be seen in the multiple stages of the 
production and the planning required to obtain raw materials, make preparations, carry 
out the production, and use the tar for hafting. Though the possibility should be 
considered that a positive outcome was reached through trial and error, making 
observations about the fire and adjusting their method for the next attempt, based on the 
production process described by Pomstra and Meijer (2011) I would still argue that the 
criteria for archaeological validity for a technical recursive element have been met. 
Though these elements also seem to be necessary for a successful adhesive production, as 
there is not yet any cognitive support for a technical elements of recursion to be an aspect 
of advanced cognition, the criteria for cognitive validity cannot be said to have been met 
in this context.
4.7.6 Cognitive fluidity
For the argument that the makers of the adhesives at Königsaue and Inden-Altdorf 
possessed cognitive fluidity to be archaeologically valid, there needs to be evidence that 
different forms of intelligence were combined during the adhesive production process. 
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The process has been shown to require a combination of at least natural history 
knowledge; with the gathering and use of raw materials; and technical knowledge; seen 
through the techniques of fire maintenance and tar production and use in hafting. As has 
been discussed in the previous chapter however, evidence in the form of the Schöningen 
spears makes this theory ungrounded in archaeological evidence. Though the production 
sequence seemingly also requires these elements, the lack of any cognitive or 
neurological support for Mithen's (1996) theory causes the inferences on cognition during 
adhesive production to lack cognitive validity.
4.8 Apprenticeship and learning
As none of the cognitive constructs discussed above have met the full criteria for both 
archaeological and cognitive validity, other options must be explored. Though it is still 
possible that the constructs are valid for Neandertal adhesive production, it cannot be 
proven with the evidence at hand. The theory of apprenticeship and learning seems 
therefore to be a very viable option as an alternative explanation to these cognitive 
constructs. As this model has been linked to both modern human problem solving (Wynn 
and Coolidge 2007), as well as that of chimpanzees and bonobos (Toth and Schick 2009; 
Boesch and Boesch-Achermann 2000), and has been proven to be capable of several very 
advanced techniques such as adze making (Stout 2002), and hafting (Wynn 2007b), it is 
very possible that this technique may have been employed in the adhesive making of 
Königsaue and Inden-Altdorf. Knowledge of procedures such as the correct depth and 
angle of burial of the bark pieces, the right duration of the fire before the bark is taken 
out, stopping the air flow to the bark, solving problems of wind and other influencing 
factors, even the keeping of the fire at the precise temperature required, may have been 
learned through a (prolonged) period of apprenticeship. If, as Wynn and Coolidge 
(2007b) argue, the expertise built up through years learning through trial and error, is 
stored in a range of procedural memories that can be recalled when needed, an entire 
sequence of procedures and activities regarding adhesive making may have been created 
during the apprenticeship period. If procedural memories were stored for all sorts of 
possible scenarios of problems and complications as well as basic procedural adhesive 
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making knowledge, this might even  account for the skills thought to have been markers 
of advanced cognition, such as switching attention, technical recursion and fourth order 
abstractions.
Table 3. Knowledge and procedures shown in Neandertal adhesive production process that 
correspond to cognitive inferences.
Cognitive construct Steps of adhesive production process shown, corresponding to 
requirements of archaeological and cognitive validity
Enhanced Working 
Memory
• No elements can be identified
Fourth-order 
abstractions
• Knowledge of required consistency of adhesive, knowledge of 
order of steps in the production procedure.
Multi-level operations 
and non-routine 
thought
• Keeping attention on fire to ensure beneficial outcome, adjusting to 
wind problems influencing temperature
• Adjusting position of birch bark for optimum outcome
Embedded Recursion • Feedback and adjustment to keep fire at correct temperature
Mental Rotation • Rotating the birch bark for a more productive outcome
Cognitive Fluidity • Knowledge of e.g. raw materials and fire making/tool making
Expertise through 
Apprenticeship and 
Learning
• Knowledge of raw materials, fire making, adhesive application 
show stock of knowledge, procedures of fire building and control, 
birch bark burying and timing show umbrella plan, tools used show 
constellation.
4.9 Conclusions
Though none of the constructs discussed above meet the criteria for both archaeological 
and cognitive validity, archaeological validity in itself has been met for the concept of 
embedded recursion. Though cognitive validity for this concept is lacking, it is not due to 
a lack of necessity of the constructs within the adhesive making process, but due to a lack 
of cognitive or neurological support for the model within cognitive science. Should 
evidence therefore be obtained of the validity of this model within cognitive science, that 
would indicate the inferences on Neandertal cognition made by this construct to be valid 
as well, showing Neandertals to have possessed certain elements regarded as markers of 
advanced cognitive sophistication. As of yet, this is not the case however. Wynn and 
Coolidge's theory of expertise makes a very viable alternative to these explanations. 
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Though enhanced working memory could also not be shown, Haidle's problem-solution 
paradigm could be useful for further research into human executive functions and 
working memory evolution. 
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Chapter 5. Discussion and Conclusions
The main research question for this thesis was whether it was possible to comment on 
Neandertal cognition through the study of AMH and Neandertal adhesive production. 
This research question was divided into several subquestions. The first question was 
whether the inferences on AMH cognition, based on the evidence for adhesive production 
were convincing and well-founded. The second was whether the adhesive production 
processes of AMH and Neandertals under review are can be reliably compared. The third 
question was whether the cognitive concepts that have been linked to AMH can be linked 
to Neandertals as well. The fourth question was whether there were any possible 
alternative cognitive explanations that might explain the adhesive production process 
other than the constructs of modern cognitive sophistication implied.
In order to answer these questions, I will first outline the methods that I employed 
to come to my results. The results of the AMH context, concerning the validity of the 
cognitive inferences made by Wadley (2010) will then be discussed, after which the same 
will be done for the Neandertal context. The two contexts will then be compared, in order 
to come to the final conclusions concerning the levels of cognitive sophistication that can 
be derived from their adhesive production processes. Alternative approaches will be 
outlined, as well as possibilities for future research.
5.1 Methods
The method employed to look into these questions involved several elements: 1. an 
elaborate review of the cognitive theories and models used within the field of cognitive 
archaeology and an analysis of their strong and weak points, 2. an inspection of the 
evidence for hafting at Sibudu Cave along with a closer look the adhesive production 
process and the implied cognitive constructs, 3. A summary of the key procedures and 
knowledge involved in AMH adhesive production, 4. An analysis of the cognitive and 
archaeological validity of the cognitive inferences made by Wadley (2010) for the makers 
of the Sibudu Cave adhesives, 5. The setting up of guidelines for the criteria of 
archaeological and cognitive validity for the cognitive constructs implied by Wadley 
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(2010), and the corresponding elements found within the production process, 6. an 
inspection of the evidence for hafting and adhesive production at the German sites of 
Königsaue and Inden-Altdorf, along with a closer look at the adhesive production 
processes that may have been employed at these sites, 7. A summary of the key 
procedures and knowledge  involved in the Neandertal adhesive production, 8. An 
analysis of the possible cognitive constructs and alternative explanations that might be 
linked to Neandertal adhesive production and their cognitive and archaeological validity.
Two methods that were employed during the writing of this thesis were especially 
helpful. The first was working with the guide of Botha's (2008) structured line of 
argument for analysing the groundedness and warantedness of cognitive inferences, as 
well as the application of Wynn and Coolidge's (2009) strict standard of archaeological 
and cognitive validity. This allowed for a critical and structured line of analysis of the 
inferences made by Wadley (2010) for the Sibudu Cave adhesive makers, as well as a 
critical application of the same cognitive constructs to the Neandertal context. The second 
method was the creation of guidelines for the criteria necessary to obtain archaeological 
and cognitive validity for the cognitive constructs proposed by Wadley. These guidelines 
allowed me to analyse the knowledge and procedures shown in the Neandertal adhesive 
making process in a most effective and structured manner, whereas prior to the setting up 
of these guidelines, that involved a lot of repetition of previously discussed information.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Literature review
The review of the cognitive archaeological literature showed a strong reliance within the 
archaeological field on theories based on symbolism to help explain archaeological traces 
of modern behaviour and cognition. This was shown to be out of step with the current 
views of cognitive science which call for a redefinition of the concept of symbolism and 
a re-evaluation of archaeology's reliance on symbolic theory. They have argued that in 
order for archaeology to truly contribute to the discussion of the evolution of cognition, a 
different approach is required. Where archaeologists have often focused on traces from 
the archaeological record, and tried to connect those to elements of cognition, the 
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argument is made that this process needs to be reversed to gain any true cognitive 
validity. They argue that archaeologists should take cognitive constructs as a starting 
point for their argument, and find a way to link these constructs to the archaeological 
record.
The Theory of Mind approach, though it could not be applied directly to the 
analysis of AMH and Neandertal adehesive production, showed that it could be 
promising in gaining a better understanding of the cognitive capabilities of different 
hominins.
Whereas the modularity and working memory approaches were shown to lack 
support from cognitive science, Haidle's (2010) problem-solution distance paradigm was 
shown to possibly provide an alternative to the investigation of the development of 
executive functions and working memory.
With Botha's (2008) and Wynn and Coolidge's (2009) strict standards and 
critiques having been shown to undermine many cognitive inferences made by 
archaeologists (d'Errico 2003; Henshilwood 2004), these strict standards were employed 
in the analysis of the cognitive inferences made by Wadley (2010) for the adhesive 
makers at Sibudu Cave. 
5.2.2 The AMH context
The inference of hafting at Sibudu Cave was shown through extensive use-wear and 
residue analysis to have been grounded and valid. The analysis of the production process 
showed the makers of the adhesive to possess a great deal of knowledge and skill. The 
steps in this production procedure were outlined in a flow chart, showing the broad 
problem-solution distance for AMH adhesive production. The archaeological and 
cognitive validity of the cognitive inferences based on the procedures and knowledge 
shown in the reproduction process of the adhesive making were shown not to be intact for 
all the cognitive constructs however. Barnard's (2010) construct of fourth-order 
abstraction, as well as Mithen's (1996) theory of cognitive fluidity, though both likely to 
have been present during adhesive production, were shown to lack both archaeological as 
well as cognitive validity. Embedded recursion (Reuland 2010) was shown to probably 
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have been used during the production sequence, but through a technical element, not a 
linguistic one, which as of yet has no cognitive support. Amati and Shallice's (2007) 
model of multi-level operations and non-routine thought was shown not to rest on 
archaeologically sound arguments. Though the elements of non-routine thought and 
multi-level operations were also shown to be present during adhesive production, 
cognitive validity could also not be proven. Mental rotation was found to be suitably 
grounded in archaeological evidence, but as there is still debate about whether or not this 
is a trait specific to only anatomically modern humans, as this ability is also partially seen 
in species of great apes (Inoue and Matsuzawa 2007), this does not make a very strong 
case for cognitive sophistication.  
As none of these constructs was able to provide both archaeological and cognitive 
validity, criteria were compiled for all five of the concepts, with the necessary 
requirements that had to be shown in order for a concept to be considered 
archaeologically and cognitively valid (chapter 3, table 1). The first subquestion set at the 
beginning of this thesis, of whether the inferences on AMH cognition based on adhesives 
production were found to be well grounded and valid, was therefore answered in the 
negative. 
5.2.3 The Neandertal context
The criteria set up in chapter three were then applied to the European context, where the 
adhesive production for the two German sites of Königsaue and Inden-Altdorf was 
discussed. Micro-wear, macrofracture, and residue analysis at these sites again provided 
strong proof that hafting had taken place at both of these sites. As the production 
processes of the African as well as the European contexts proved to involve many similar 
aspects of required procedures and knowledge, the second research sub-question, whether 
the two contexts could be reliably compared was answered in the positive. The steps in 
this production procedure were outlined in a flow chart, showing the broad problem-
solution distance for Neandertal adhesive production.
Application of these requirements to the Neandertal context showed the construct 
of fourth-order abstraction to very likely have been present during adhesive production, 
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though this could not be proven, making the claim ungrounded. The lack of support from 
cognitive science left the theory unwarranted in this case as well. Embedded recursion 
and multi-level operations and non-routine thought had the same problems as when 
applied to the AMH context, making them ungrounded, and unwarranted, though both 
likely to have been applied during adhesive production. Mental rotation were shown not 
to be able to convincingly meet the criteria for archaeological validity. As the necessity 
for mental rotation could not be shown in this case, cognitive validity also did not remain 
intact.
5.2.3 Linking the contexts 
Though the Neandertal adhesive was definitely a simpler adhesive regarding production, 
elements of cognition involved proved to be very similar, despite none of them being able 
to meet the criteria for both archaeological and cognitive validity in either context. The 
third subquestion therefore, whether the cognitive concepts that have been linked to 
AMH could also be linked to Neandertals, is a difficult question to answer. With the 
exception of mental rotation, the same cognitive concepts linked to the production 
sequence of AMH adhesives, could also be linked to the production sequence of 
Neandertals, namely multi-level operations and non-routine thought, embedded 
recursion, and cognitive fluidity. Because these concepts did not meet the requirements of 
the strict standard for either context, no clear conclusions can be drawn from this 
information. What can be said is that if these models should find support from cognitive 
science, it would require a possible reconsideration of the cognitive capabilities of 
Neandertals, as the inferences for several of the constructs discussed above would be 
equally valid for the AMH context as for the Neandertal context. 
Especially the models of embedded recursion, multi-level operations and non-
routine thought, and fourth-order abstraction show considerable promise. Though abstract 
concepts are obviously very difficult to provide evidence for in past actions, it does seem 
highly probably that these concepts were in fact employed in the production sequence for 
both contexts. Multi-level operations and non-routine thought can be shown more easily, 
but would require a restructuring of the archaeological side of its model, as it does not 
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currently hold up to the criteria of groundedness. Mithen's theory of cognitive fluidity 
seems least promising as it has been greatly critiqued from an archaeological as well as a 
cognitive perspective.
Haidle's (2010) problem-solution distance model could be compared for the two 
contexts however, through the flow charts set up in both chapters. These indicated AMH 
adhesive production to consist of more individual steps than that of Neandertals, possibly 
indicating a higher degree of flexibility in AMH cognitive capacities, and reflective of 
further developed executive functions of working memory (ibid.). This would of course 
require further investigation through more similar studies comparing the Nandertals and 
AMH through this line of investigation.
5.3 Alternative explanations
Looking at subquestion 4, whether there are any possible alternative explanations for the 
cognitive inferences made through the adhesive production process, other than that the 
procedures and knowledge that were used being were examples of modern cognitive 
sophistication, there is an explanation that might fit this description. I have argued that 
the model of expertise through apprenticeship and learning proposed by Wynn and 
Coolidge (2007b) could be responsible for the adhesive production of not just the two 
Neandertal sites, but also for that of Sibudu Cave. Apprenticeship and learning is not only 
one of the most employed problem solving strategies used today, but has also been shown 
to be used by chimpanzees and bonobos (Toth and Schick 2009; Boesch and Boesch-
Achermann 2000) and to be capable of producing very well-worked adzes (Stout 2002), 
as well as hafted spears (Wynn and Coolidge 2007b). Levallois reduction has also been 
shown to employ elements of this strategy (Wynn and Coolidge 2009). It is thought to 
have been one of the main problem solving strategies used by Neandertals (Wynn and 
Coolidge 2009). As the two production sequences share so many similarities of required 
knowledge and skill however, I have made the case that expertise may also very well 
have been responsible for the adhesive production at Sibudu Cave. Whether or not the 
makers of the Sibudu adhesives in fact were more cognitively advanced, Occam's razor 
would argue that if expertise were capable of producing the adhesives at Sibudu, being 
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the cognitively simpler explanation, this is likely the process that was responsible for its 
production.
5.4 Concluding remarks and possibilities for future research
Having reviewed the results of both AMH and Neandertal adhesive making and its 
cognitive implications, it has proven to be extremely difficult for any cognitive inferences 
that are made to live up to the standards of cognitive and archaological validity, 
groundedness, or warrantedness. None of the cognitive inferences discussed in this thesis 
have been able to meet these standards completely. This raises the question of whether 
the guidelines for proper cognitive archaeology employed in this study, namely Wynn and 
Coolidge's (2009) strict standard, and Botha's (2008) line of argument, are possibly too 
strict. I believe this is not the case. Though indeed strict, I believe this guidelines are 
necessary in order for archaeology to be able to contribute any valid information to the 
study of cognitive evolution that will be accepted by the field of cognitive science. 
Though it seems likely that people producing these adhesives did possess certain 
elements of sophisticated cognition, the negative result of this study shows the difficulty 
of trying to comment on mental states of past people. Cognitive archaeology is certainly 
at a disadvantage not being able to study the subjects under discussion, yet even so, it 
cannot simply be content with likelihoods and probabilities. To be of any real value in the 
field of cognitive research, strong evidence must be found of the inferences on cognition 
that are made, however difficult that may be. I believe that these guidelines should 
therefore remain a standard for validity in cognitive archaeological research, and might 
inspire more careful multi-disciplinary work in the future that will produce more concrete 
results.
One possibility for further research would be the idea proposed by Barnard 
(2010). In order to validate the construct of fourth-order abstraction specifically for 
adhesive making, experiments would need to be set up where novices are instructed to 
create similar adhesives with and without the help of abstract concepts. Only when it can 
be proven that abstractions were absolutely necessary for the production of adhesives can 
the construct fulfill the criteria of archaeological and cognitive validity, though of course 
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support would still need to be found for the theory itself. 
Another possibility for further research would be studies looking into the 
problem-solution distance of AMH and Neandertals for different technical sequences, as 
proposed by Haidle (2010). These could provide information on the mental flexibility of 
hominins during different point of their evolution. This might be a way to comment on 
their cognitive development without implying very far-reaching changes in human 
cognition that have only weak archaeological links, or looking at very narrow and 
specific archaeological instances that are difficult to tie to any cognitive implications.
What this study has shown is the general under-appreciation of the cognitive skill 
of Neandertals. Where AMH are constantly linked with all sorts of concepts of cognitive 
sophistication, this is rarely done for Neandertals. This once again underlines the double 
standard at work in archaeolgy. This study has shown that, at least for the process of 
adhesive making, Neandertals possessed many similar forms of knowledge and skill as 
those of modern humans, and should as such, not simply be left out in the discussion of 
cognitive abilities as they often have been in the past.
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Abstract
This study focuses on the cognitive inferences that can be made through the production of 
Palaeolithic adhesives. Whereas this production sequence had been linked through its 
procedures and knowledge to several constructs of modern cognitive sophistication for 
anatomically modern humans, this has not been the case for Neandertals. This study 
compares adhesive production processes for AMH from Sibudu Cave, South-Africa 
(Wadley 2010), to those of Neandertals at the palaeolithic German sites of Konigsaue 
(Koller, Baumer and Mania 2002) and Inden-Altdorf (Pawlik and Thiseen 2011). Results 
show that the production sequences for the different contexts share many similarities, yet 
cognitive inferences made for the both contexts lack archaeological as well as cognitive 
validity. An alternative explanation is proposed in the form of Wynn and Coolidge's 
(2007b) theory of expertise through apprenticeship and learning. 
